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Article Title: Does the @realDonaldTrump Really Matter to Financial Markets? 
Abstract: Does the @realDonaldTrump really matter to financial markets? Research 
shows that new information about the likely future policy direction of government affects 
financial markets. In contrast, we argue that new information can also arise about the 
likely future government's resolve in following through with its policy goals, affecting 
financial markets as well. We test our argument using data on US president Donald J. 
Trump's Mexico-related policy tweets and the US dollar/Mexican peso exchange rate. We 
find that Trump's Mexico-related tweets raised Mexican peso volatility while his policy 
views were unknown as well as thereafter, as they signaled his resolve in carrying out his 
Mexico-related agenda. By helping politicians disseminate policy information to voters 
and voters hold governments accountable for their policy performance, social media allows 
investors to gather information about the likely policy direction and policy resolve of 
government, especially those of newcomers whose direction and resolve are unknown. 
Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to repli-
cate all analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science 
Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8JHA2X. 
Word Count: 149 (abstract); approximately 10,000 (manuscript, footnotes, and refer-
ences; excluding tables and figures) 
Does the @realDonaldTrump really matter to financial markets? Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that economic policy statements made by US President Donald J. Trump via 
microblogging website Twitter have the power to rattle financial markets. As one market 
analyst notes, it is "important for market participants to be aware of the potential for 
increased volatilities facing individual equities related to a [Trump] Twitter release."1 As 
another observes, "[w]ith Trump's approach to governance via Twitter, it's no wonder 
that [currency market] volatility has increased."2 Yet, other analysts claim that Trump's 
economic policy tweets have no impact on financial markets, with asset price values and 
volatility reflecting information about economic fundamentals rather than Trump's Twit-
ter feed. Some even note that firms targeted in his tweets often outperform their markets.3 
While market analysts present two contrasting views about the impact of Trump's 
economic policy tweets on financial markets, the academic literature suggests that his 
tweets should not matter to investors. Financial economists argue that financial markets 
are efficient, with asset prices reflecting all publicly available information (Fama 1970, 
1991). Political economists build on this to suggest that only new and unanticipated 
information about the future political and economic policy direction of government should 
affect investors' views about the future value of their assets ( e.g., Garfinkel, Glazer and Lee 
1999; Freeman, Hays and Stix 2000; Pantzalis, Stangeland and Turtle 2000; Bernhard and 
Leblang 2006; Leblang and Bernhard 2006; Fowler 2006; Mosley and Singer 2008; Bechtel 
2009; Sattler 2013). By this logic, Trump's economic policy tweets should have only 
mattered to financial markets while his policy agenda was unknown; once the direction 
of his economic policy views were clear, his tweets would not have provided any new 
information to investors, leaving financial markets untouched. 
Yet, research also clarifies the conditions under which news about the likely future 
political orientation of government affects financial markets, suggesting another way that 
Trump's economic policy tweets might matter. Distinguishing politicians' policy agenda 





from policy capacity, scholars argue that news about the likely future policy direction of 
government triggers stronger financial market reactions when governments enjoy greater 
political institutional capacity to implement policy change (Bernhard and Leblang 2006; 
Fowler 2006; Bechtel 2009; Sattler 2013; Freeman, Hays and Stix 2000; Mosley and Singer 
2008). In a distinct line of study, scholars argue that news about the likely future political 
orientation of government triggers stronger investor reactions when it concerns lesser-
known non-incumbent candidates or political newcomers (Bernhard and Leblang 2006; 
Jensen and Schmith 2005; Fowler 2006). The policy pledges of newcomers are less credible 
than those of incumbent candidates and experienced politicians, who have previously 
revealed their policy preferences and willingness to follow through when in office (Jensen 
and Schmith 2005; Fowler 2006). 
Yet, this last line of research treats politicians' expected policy direction and policy 
credibility as interchangeable, two things that we argue should be treated as distinct. It is 
possible for both newcomer and seasoned politicians to clarify their economic policy goals 
and shift in their resolve to follow them through. With this in mind, we introduce two 
theoretical innovations. First, we disentangle investors' concern with the likely economic 
policy direction of government from their concern with its likely economic policy resolve. 
Second, we allow both policy direction and policy resolve to vary with new information. 
We argue that, just as new and unanticipated information about the policy direction of 
government affects investors' views about the future value of their assets, so too does news 
about the resolve of government to carry out its stated economic policy goals. By our 
logic, Trump's economic policy tweets would have mattered to financial markets before his 
economic policy agenda was known-as investors adjusted their holdings to news about 
his policy views-as well as after his policy agenda was clear-as investors adjusted to 
news about his likely resolve in following through. 
We test our argument by examining the impact of Trump's Mexico-related policy 
tweets on the US dollar~Mexican peso (USD /MXN) exchange rate. This data is ideal for 
three reasons. First, Trump was a newcomer to national US politics, raising the chances 
that his economic policy statements contained new information about his economic policy 
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views and his economic policy resolve. Second, during the period under examination 
(January 2015 to February 2018), Trump restated what are clearly negative views about 
the effect of the cross-border movement of people and production between the US and 
Mexico on the US economy. Third, Trump frequently expressed his Mexico-related policy 
views via Twitter. Politicians use social media to disseminate policy news, establish issue 
positions, and engage in national policy debates (Gainous and Wagner 2013; Kreiss 2016; 
Stier et al. 2018), forcing traditional media outlets to respond to (rather drive reports of) 
politicians' policy views. It is the speed through which social media transmits information 
directly from politicians to voters (Gainous and Wagner 2013) that we argue raises its 
value to investors seeking timely, market-relevant news. 
If investors only respond to news about the likely future economic policy direc-
tion of government, then Trump's Mexico-related policy tweets should have affected the 
USD /MXN exchange rate early in his campaign, before his Mexico-related agenda became 
clear. If, as we argue, investors respond to news about both the future economic policy di-
rection and the future policy resolve of government, Trump's Mexico-related tweets would 
have affected the exchange rate both before and after his Mexico-related policy views were 
known. Analysis of daily USD /MXN exchange rates shows that Trump's Mexico-related 
policy tweets mattered to financial markets in both periods, in line with our argument. 
In making this argument, we contribute to research on politics and financial markets by 
revealing that two types of economic policy information matter to investors: information 
about likely government policy direction and information about likely government pol-
icy resolve. Although we focus on a political newcomer to make this point, incumbent 
candidates and experienced politicians can also surprise investors with shifts in policy 
preferences and in their resolve in following through. As such, we argue that investors 
will seek out news about all potential future and current governments' likely future policy 
direction and policy resolve, regardless of the level of experience of the politicians in them. 
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Two Arguments About Government Economic Policy 
Information and Financial Markets 
Information about Economic Policy Direction 
The (semi-strong form) Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) states that asset prices reflect 
all publicly available information, including historic prices and any additional relevant 
publicly available information (Fama 1970, 1991; Bernhard and Leblang 2006). Scholars 
have interpreted this to mean that new and unanticipated information about the likely 
future political orientation-and thus economic policy direction-of government leads 
investors to adjust their expectations about the future value of their holdings. Known 
and anticipated information leaves financial markets untouched (Bernhard and Leblang 
2006). 
Empirical evidence-often based on highly disaggregated (daily, hourly) time series 
data-supports this view (Freeman, Hays and Stix 2000; Leblang and Mukherjee 2004, 
2005; Bernhard and Leblang 2006; Leblang and Bernhard 2006; Goodell and Vahamaa 
2013; Kelly, Pastor and Vernonesi 2016). Cross-national time-series analyses of highly 
aggregated data (monthly, quarterly) also indicate that government selection periods pro-
duce greater financial market volatility ( Garfinkel, Glazer and Lee 1999; Pantzalis, Stan-
geland and Turtle 2000; Bernhard and Leblang 2006; Fowler 2006; Bialkowski, Gottschalk 
and Wisniewski 2008; Bechtel 2009; Boutchkova et al. 2012; Frot and Santiso 2013; Wais-
man, Ye and Zhu 2015). It is during these periods that news tends to arrive about the 
likely future economic policy direction of government , raising the frequency and magni-
tude of investor adjustment.4 By this logic, news about the likely future economic policy 
direction of government will affect investors' views about the value of their assets. 
4News also arises during cabinet changes (Leblang and Bernhard 2006; Bernhard and Leblang 2008; 
Kelly, Pastor and Vernonesi 2016). 
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Information about Economic Policy Resolve 
Yet, a related line of research shows that news about the future political orientation of 
government triggers stronger financial market reactions when governments enjoy greater 
political capacity to implement policy change. Fewer veto players-as a result of ma-
jority or unified government (Bernhard and Leblang 2006; Fowler 2006; Bechtel 2009; 
Sattler 2013)-and weaker regulatory frameworks-as a result of weak monetary policy 
commitment or shareholder protections (Freeman, Hays and Stix 2000; Mosley and Singer 
2008)-produce greater volatility during and after government selection. For these schol-
ars, the impact of news about the likely future economic policy direction of government 
on financial markets is distinct from news about their political capacity to follow through. 
In another, related line of work, scholars argue that news about the likely future political 
orientation of government triggers stronger investor reactions when it concerns lesser-
known non-incumbent candidates or political newcomers (Bernhard and Leblang 2006; 
Jen sen and Schmith 2005; Fowler 2006). For these scholars, the economic policy promises 
of newcomers are less credible, that is, less likely to be implemented-and their govern-
ments thus more uncertain and risky for investors-than those of experienced politicians 
who have already revealed their policy agenda and demonstrated their resolve in following 
through when in office (Jensen and Schmith 2005; Fowler 2006). 
Interestingly, this last line of research treats the likely policy direction and likely policy 
credibility of government as interchangeable and constant through time. Yet, it is possible 
for politicians to clarify their policy positions and shift in the credibility of their intention 
in following through. We argue that a potential future or current government's likely 
future economic policy goals should be considered separately from its policy resolve. By 
"policy resolve," we refer to the level of certainty surrounding or strength in a government's 
intention of following through with its policy goals (Weeks 2008). When governments are 
resolute, they adhere to their policy goals with precision and implement them to the fullest 
extent. When they are not resolute, they may deviate in some way or fully renege. We 
choose the term "policy resolve" for two reasons. First, we seek to capture a politician's 
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intention of following through with her stated policy goals in a way that is conceptually 
distinct from her stated policy positions, similar to Callander (2008). Second, we seek 
to distinguish policy resolve from policy salience-the importance a politician places on 
her policy goals-as well as policy capacity-the political (institutional) capacity of a 
politician to follow through. 
With this in mind, we argue that news can arise both about a government's likely eco-
nomic policy direction as well as about its likely economic policy resolve, with each affect-
ing investors' views about their assets through distinct causal paths. Research shows that 
incumbent politicians establish the credibility of their policy agenda and intention of fol-
lowing through by building a reputation for faithfully implementing prior policy promises 
(Shepsle 1991; Aragones, Postlewaite and Palfrey 2007). Lesser-known non-incumbents 
and political newcomers cannot leverage previous policy reputations, but they can signal 
the credibility of their policy agenda and resolve in following through with publicly-made 
statements (Aragones, Postlewaite and Palfrey 2007; Callander 2008). By making clear, 
precise domestic policy promises, politicians raise the "reputational" costs of deviation by 
enabling voters to hold them accountable (Aragones, Postlewaite and Palfrey 2007; Asako 
2015). By making clear, progressively stronger foreign policy promises, incumbent gov-
ernments raise the domestic "audience" costs of backing down (Fearon 1994; Tomz 2007; 
Weeks 2008).5 Even if such domestic and foreign policy promises are not binding-as they 
do not disable future policy discretion (Shepsle 1991)-they create a benchmark against 
which politicians' future policy performance can be compared (Fearon 1994; Aragones, 
Postlewaite and Palfrey 2007; Tomz 2007; Weeks 2008), and thereby act as a signal of 
their policy resolve in following through. 
Building on this logic, we thus argue that, just as politicians' economic policy state-
ments initially provide information to investors about the likely future economic policy 
direction of government, these same economic policy statements continue to provide in-
5 Because voters pay attention to politicians' (domestic and foreign) policy promises and punish them 
for deviation, such reputational or audience costs should be of concern to politicians (Tomz 2007; Naurin, 
Soroka and Markwat 2019). Voters more harshly judge the deviation of politicians whose policy agenda 
(direction) is closest to their own (Naurin, Soroka and Markwat 2019) and whose escalation (resolve) 
seemed greatest (Tomz 2007). 
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vestors with incremental evidence of the sincerity of politicians' intentions of following 
through once their policy views are known. It is in solidifying this benchmark-against 
which their future policy implementation can be compared-that politicians signal their 
economic policy resolve to investors. In response, investors update their expectations 
about the future value of their assets to both types of economic policy news, affecting 
financial markets in turn. New and unanticipated statements revealing the potential 
economic policy orientation of government as well as new and unanticipated statements 
signaling the potential economic policy resolve of government ( once its policy views are 
known) should therefore matter to investors. In making this argument, we extend tra-
ditional applications of the EMH in two ways. First, we extend it from news about 
economic policy direction to news about economic policy resolve. Second, we clarify 
the role of politicians' economic policy statements in providing information about policy 
direction as well as policy resolve. 
Empirical Strategy: Trump's Mexico-Related Tweets 
and Mexican Peso Volatility 
Why Examine Trump's Mexico-Related Tweets? 
We evaluate support for our argument through an examination of Trump's Mexico-related 
policy tweets and US dollar/Mexican peso (USD/ MXN) exchange rate volatility. We 
choose this focus for several reasons. 
Trump was a newcomer to the US national political arena, raising the chances that his 
economic policy statements contained new information about his policy views and resolve 
in following through. Testing our argument would be difficult using data on seasoned 
politicians whose economic policy statements might be devoid of news about their policy 
agenda or resolve. 
Trump's Mexico-related policy agenda was consistently negative for the Mexican econ-
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omy. On immigration, Trump stated: "When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending 
their best ... I will immediately terminate President Obama's illegal executive order on im-
migration ... " On the border: "I will build a great, great wall on our southern border..." 
On jobs: "I'll bring back our jobs ... from Mexico ... "6 On economic cooperation, "I intend 
to immediately renegotiate the terms of that (NAFTA) agreement to get a better deal...If 
they do not agree ... America intends to withdraw from the deal." 7 Testing our argument 
would be difficult using data from politicians making only vague policy statements. 
Trump's capacity to enact his Mexico-related policy agenda was unequivocal. A bor-
der wall needs congressional funding but increased patrols and deportations need only 
presidential orders to the Department of Homeland Security (Noland et al. 2016). Un-
der NAFTA, the president need only proclaim the return of Mexico to "Most Favored 
Nation" status and can raise duties in consultation with Congress. The president also 
enjoys other executive tools to justify tariffs or quotas (Noland et al. 2016). Testing our 
argument would be difficult using data from political contexts preventing policy change. 
Trump regularly stated his Mexico-related policy goals via Twitter, sending over 400 
Mexico-related policy tweets from 1 January 2015 to 2 February 2018, the period we ex-
amine. Market analysts often noted that these tweets rattled the Mexican peso market. 
For example, a January 2017 border wall tweet ("Big day planned on NATIONAL SECU-
RITY tomorrow ... we will build a wall.") 8 and two August 2017 NAFTA tweets (NAFTA 
is the "worst trade deal ever made") were thought to have sent the peso tumbling.9 Test-
ing our argument would be difficult using economic policy statements disseminated via 
traditional media, since such reporting likely responds to Trump's Twitter feed. 
6http://time.com/ 3923128 / donald-trump-announcement-speech/. 
7https:/ / assets.donaldjtrump.com/DJT _DeclaringAmericanEconomiclndependence.pdf. 





Why Examine Mexican Peso Volatility? 
We examine the impact of Trump's Mexico-related tweets on USD /MXN exchange rate 
volatility, not value. Financial economists have difficulty forecasting exchange rate val-
ues due to investor heterogeneity (Lyons 2001; Dominguez and Panthaki 2006; Cheung 
et al. 2018). Currency investors often hold different expectations about the impact of 
the same political and economic news on their holdings (Lyons 2001). They also often 
differ in their trading strategies in response. Technicals-oriented traders-driven by short-
term price history-buy (sell) while fundamentals-oriented investors ( driven by long-term 
economic fundamentals) sell (buy) when asset prices rise (fall) (Lyons 2001). Currency 
investors also differ in their portfolio strategies ( G !en and Jorion 1993); some hold curren-
cies for speculative purposes, but others for managing currency exposure in other assets 
(Campbell, Medeiros and Viceira 2010). Whether news translates into currency price 
shifts often depends on the balance among heterogeneous investors at that point in time 
(Dominguez and Panthaki 2006; Cheung et al. 2018). 
Investor heterogeneity is relevant for the Mexican peso. Even though many currency 
investors are guided by Mexico's macroeconomic fundamentals, others with heterogeneous 
trading and portfolio strategies confound the impact of news on peso value (Sidaoui, 
Ramos-Francia and Cuadra 2011; Garda-Verdu and Zerecero 2014). Further complicating 
forecasts, the Mexican peso is one of three emerging market currencies (with the South 
African Rand and the Turkish Lira) traded 24 hours a day, five days a week, and plays a 
crucial role in expressing concern about emerging markets. Instead of trading in or out 
of emerging market assets, many investors take long (optimistic) or short (pessimistic) 
positions on the Mexican peso to hedge local currency exposure. 10 
Even so, the arrival of political and economic news raises currency volatility, pre-
cisely because of investor heterogeneity. Currency volatility reflects the bounds around 
which some investors anticipate appreciation and others depreciation of a currency, with 
greater volatility capturing greater dispersion and greater market uncertainty. News that 
10https: / / www.cnbc.com/201 7 /03 /03/trumps-fallout-effect-on-the- mexican-peso. html. 
9 
simultaneously reinforces some investors' optimistic and other investors' pessimistic views 
about future currency prices leads them to reevaluate their reserve prices and to buy and 
sell currencies, respectively (Epps 1975; Tauchen and Pitts 1983), raising trading vol-
ume and price volatility (Dominguez and Panthaki 2006; Bauwens, Rime and Sucarrat 
2008) .11 Traders' activities also provide currency dealers with private information about 
these views, triggering additional trading and volatility (Dominguez and Panthaki 2006; 
Bauwens, Rime and Sucarrat 2008). Investors' heterogeneous trading and portfolio strate-
gies in response to news further raises trading volume and volatility. We thus expect news 
about Trump's economic policy direction and resolve to affect USD /MXN exchange rate 
volatility, even if we do not expect it to affect exchange rate value (although we allow for 
this possibility below). 
Currency volatility is important for investors and governments. It harms companies 
when settling foreign transactions, hurting profits and valuations (Papaioannou 2006). 
It harms international trade and investment, given investors' aversion to currency risk 
(Guzman, Ocampo and Stiglitz 2018). Excess volatility can lead to speculative currency 
attacks and devaluations with macroeconomic and distributional effects (Leblang 2002). 
Firms can hedge currency exposure, but only larger ones enjoy this capacity (Papaioannou 
2006). Portfolio investors can hedge as well, but this requires costly planning ( Campbell, 
Medeiros and Viceira 2010). Governments mindful of the impact of currency volatility can 
intervene, but this depletes foreign reserves and has macroeconomic and distributional 
consequences (Frieden 2015). Mexican central bank officials complained that Trump's 
tweets forced them to undertake costly measures to defend the peso, with traders joking 
that it would be cheaper for them to buy Twitter and shut it down. 12 
11Currency volatility can also result from homogenous investors shifting their expectations together, 
although this is less likely in larger markets. 
12 http://www.reuters.com/ article/ us-mexico-peso-trump/ mexican-central-banker-says-trumps-tweets-
modified-peso-strategy-idUSKBNl 7803N. 
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How Trump's Tweets Signal Policy Direction 
Most prior studies argue that news about the economic policy direction of government 
affects financial markets, with known and anticipated information having no effect. Ac-
cordingly, Trump's Mexico-related policy tweets should have affected the USD / MXN 
market until he launched his bid for the GOP nomination on 16 June 2015; during this 
period his views were first being considered. 13 Investors would have examined his tweets 
for news about his Mexico-related agenda and updated their holdings-however remote 
the possibility he would win-raising USD /MXN exchange rate volatility. The impact of 
Trump's Mexico-related policy tweets would have disappeared by the time he launched 
his GOP bid on 16 June 2015 in a policy speech (and again on 28 June 2015) where he 
outlined his Mexico-related goals. His Mexico-related tweets would have also provided no 
new information after his GOP bid launch, after his GOP nomination on 19 July 2016, 
his election win on 8 November 2016, and his 20 January 2017 inauguration. 
We consider the impact of Trump's Mexico-related tweets across these periods because 
investors might have expected Trump to deploy different policy strategies during the 
presidential selection process. Models of electoral competition note that primary election 
voters tend to be staunch party supporters with more extreme policy views, so primary 
candidates tend to choose more extreme positions to maximize the chances of selection 
(Burden 2004). General election voters tend to be more moderate, so candidates tend 
to moderate positions during general elections to maximize their appeal (Burden 2004). 
Investors' interest in anticipating Trump's most likely economic policy orientation (should 
he win) would have raised their sensitivity to the fact that he might strategically shift 
policy positions at different points to maximize support. 
However, even if investors anticipated Trump would adopt extreme policy stances dur-
ing the primary period, the impact of his Mexico-related tweets on the Mexican peso would 
have remained the same. Because Trump's Mexico-related views remained unchanged, his 
13It was suspected by early 2015 that Trump was considering a run for president. He had a political 
team in place in 2013 and chose not to renew his television contract for "The Apprentice" in February 
2015. http://www.tvguide.com/ news/ donald-trump-presidential-campaign-timeline/. 
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tweets offered no new information during the primary campaign. Even if investors were 
surprised to find Trump's Mexico-related policy views unchanged after he won the GOP 
nomination, the impact of his Mexico-related tweets on the USD /MXN exchange rate 
during this period would have remained largely the same as well. The EMH predicts that 
investors immediately adjust their holdings to new information, something that would 
have left the lion's share of Trump's Mexico-related tweets during his four month-long 
general election campaign devoid of news about his views. Therefore, by the logic of the 
EMH for news about policy direction, Trump's Mexico-related tweets should have had no 
discernible impact on the USD /MXN exchange rate during any period after he announced 
his candidacy (e.g., the GOP primaries, general election period, post-election period, or 
after he took office). We thus expect (see Table 1): 
Hl: Donald Trump's Mexico-related policy tweets will raise USD/MXN exchange rate 
volatility before his 16 July 2015 bid for the GOP presidential nomination, but will have 
no effect on volatility thereafter. 
[Table 1 about here] 
How Trump's Tweets Signal Policy Resolve 
Recent research suggests that information about government economic policy resolve 
might also matter to investors. We argue that Trump's Mexico-related policy tweets 
provided news not just about his likely policy direction but also about his likely pol-
icy resolve. Our argument is twofold. First, in line with the argument above, Trump's 
Mexico-related policy tweets would have affected the Mexican peso market in the run-up 
to his bid for the GOP nomination in June 2015, when his Mexico-related policy views 
were first becoming known. Second, in contrast to the argument above, we argue that 
Trump's Mexico-related policy tweets would have affected the USD/MXN exchange rate 
after his June 2015 campaign launch (i.e. , during the GOP nomination, presidential elec-
tion, and inauguration). After his views were known, Trump's Mexico-related tweets 
clarified the benchmark against which his future policy performance could be compared. 
By gradually raising the reputational costs of deviation, Trump's Mexico-related policy 
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tweets progressively raised investors' expectations about his Mexico-related policy resolve, 
repeatedly raising USD /MXN exchange rate volatility in turn. 
It is investors' concern not just with government policy direction but also with its 
policy resolve that raises their awareness of the potential for strategic policy shifts. If 
investors anticipated Trump would adopt an extreme policy stance during the primary 
process, they would not have considered his Mexico-related tweets for news about his 
policy resolve. Trump's tweets would thus have had no effect on the peso during this 
period. If investors were later surprised by the lack of moderation of Trump's Mexico-
related policy stance after his GOP nomination, they would have immediately adjusted 
their views in response. Most of Trump's Mexico-related tweets during the sixteen-week 
general election campaign would have been devoid of any news about his policy position. 
However, in contrast to the argument above, we argue that investors seeking infor-
mation about Trump's Mexico-related policy resolve would have considered his post-
GOP nomination tweets for evidence of it, triggering bouts of USD /MXN exchange rate 
volatility throughout the general election period. Moreover, even though Trump's Mexico-
related policy views were well known after his November 2016 election and January 2017 
inauguration, his Mexico-related policy tweets would have continued to provide incremen-
tal information about his policy resolve during these periods as well, leading to increased 
exchange rate volatility. Of course, some investors might have believed that Trump sent 
his Mexico-related policy tweets during these latter two periods to influence Congress 
( on the border wall or immigration), foreign direct investors ( considering operations in 
Mexico), or the Mexican government (on NAFTA). But it is precisely in anticipation of 
these negotiations that he would have sought to strengthen the credibility of his policy 
resolve through repeated, consistent policy statements, leading to USD /MXN exchange 
rate volatility in the way we argue here. We thus expect (see Table 1): 
H2: Donald Trump's Mexico-related policy tweets will raise USD/MXN exchange rate 
volatility before his 16 July 2015 bid for the GOP presidential nomination, and will raise 
USD /MXN exchange rate volatility after his 19 July 2016 GOP primary election victory. 
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Data 
Our main dependent variable is the percentage change in the daily USD /MXN exchange 
rate from 1 January 2015 to 2 February 2018. We transformed the series into the daily 
percentage change in the USD /MXN exchange rate, such that rising (falling) values reflect 
the depreciation (appreciation) of the Mexican peso relative to the US dollar. Unit root 
tests in the Supplemental Information (SI, p. 1) indicate that the dependent variable is 
stationary. Exchange rate data is available for all days markets are open. All data sources 
are noted in the SI (p. 1). 
Figure 1 plots the raw peso-dollar exchange rate and the transformed % Change Peso. 
The exchange rate faced periods of substantial volatility, with the most notable spike 
just after the 2016 US presidential election. We examine USD /MXN exchange rates in 
nominal rather than real ( or other adjusted) rates since investors' short-term currency 
expectations are based on the former, and research shows that they do not consider pur-
chasing power parity, interest and inflation rate differentials , or productivity when taking 
currency positions ( Cheung and Chinn 2001; Chinn and Quayyum 2012). Mexico's foreign 
exchange commission ( the secretary and two deputy secretaries of the finance ministry, 
the governor and two subgovernors of the central bank) also bases its interventions (im-
plemented by the central bank) on short-term nominal exchange rates (Carda-Verd u and 
Zerecero 2014). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Our main explanatory variable is the daily presence of a Mexico-related policy tweet. 
We use information from the Trump Twitter Archive, which archives all tweets sent by 
@realDonaldTrump on GitHub. Trump sent over 14,500 tweets between 1 January 2015 
to 2 February 2018. We searched these tweets for topics related to Trump's Mexico-related 
policy agenda based on 17 relevant keywords-see Figure 2a-yielding 438 Mexico-related 
tweets sent on 239 days in our sample. Figure 2a shows the proportion of days when a 
Mexico-related term was mentioned for each of the 17 keywords. Figure 2b shows the 
14 
monthly count of keywords. There is a large spike in mid-2015-after Trump announced 
his bid for the GOP nomination on 16 June 2015-but he regularly sent Mexico-related 
tweets before, d ming, and after the US presidential selection process. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Modeling Strategy 
We use generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models for 
our analysis. These have been used to model a variety of political economy applications 
concerning unanticipated shocks to markets (e.g., Gronke and Brehm 2002; Leblang and 
Bernhard 2006; Hellwig 2007), although other approaches such as event study designs 
with synthetic controls are also possible (e.g., Bechtel and Schneider 2010). We rely 
on the GARCH approach because we are interested in understanding how tweets affect 
volatility in the USD /MXN exchange rate, while allowing for the possibility that they 
might affect its value. GARCH models allow us to model both the conditional mean and 
the conditional error variance as a function of lagged variance, lagged stochastic shocks, 
and exogenous covariates. Our model appears as: 
(1) 
where the dependent variable-the daily percentage change in the USD / MXN exchange 
rate-is modeled by a constant, its own lag, a vector of exogenous independent variables 
x, a stochastic error term with mean zero and variance that may be conditional on t: 
e1 ~N(0,cr;), and the lagged error variance itself cr;_ 1, since greater volatility in previous 
periods may affect current changes in the USD /MXN exchange rate. 
We include the following explanatory variables: 
• Tweet Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if Trump sent any Mexico-related 
tweets on a particular day, zero otherwise. 
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• Trump Pre-Primary Candidate is a dummy variable equal to one from 1 January to 
15 June 2015, zero otherwise, indicating the days until Trump launched his GOP 
nomination bid. 
• Trump Primary Candidate is a dummy variable equal to one from 16 June 2015 to 
18 July 2016, zero otherwise, indicating the days during Trump's GOP candidacy 
until his GOP nomination. 
• Trump GOP Nominee is a dummy variable equal to one from 19 July 2016 to 8 
November 2016, zero otherwise, indicating the days from Trump's GOP nomination 
through the 8 November presidential election, since the election was decided after 
the most active trading hours. 
• President-Elect is a dummy variable equal to one from 9 November 2016 to 20 Jan-
uary 2017, zero otherwise, indicating the period after Trump won the US presidential 
election until his inauguration. 
• Trump Presidency is a dummy variable equal to one starting the day after Trump 
took office on 20 January 2017, zero otherwise, indicating the period under his 
presidency. 
Since the Mexican economy is vulnerable to US political events (Nippani and Arize 
2005; Schaub 2017), we include: 
• US Presidential Election is a dummy variable equal to one on 9 November 2016, the 
day after the 8 November 2016 US presidential election, zero otherwise. We also 
include its lag. 
• NAFTA is a dummy variable equal to one during NAFTA-related events (US public 
hearings, announced NAFTA negotiations and negotiating objectives, four NAFTA 
rounds in 2017), zero otherwise. 
Since the Mexican peso is susceptible to US and Mexican macroeconomic performance 
and policy shocks (Nippani and Arize 2005; Schaub 2017), we include: 
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• S&P 500i-l is the lagged percentage change in the US S&P 500 stock market index, 
capturing shifts in expectations about US economic performance which affect views 
about the Mexican economy and the USD / MXN exchange rate. 14 
• Bond Spreadi-l is the lagged percentage change in the 10 year Mexico-US bond 
spread. 
• Banxico US $ Sales is a dummy variable equal to one if Mexico's central bank (at 
the behest of the foreign exchange commission) offered US dollar auctions or dollar 
futures contracts that day, zero otherwise. 
• ,6.ln(Banxico US$ Stocki) is the change in the log of the Mexican central bank's 
reported weekly US dollar reserves. 
• ,6. Overnight Rate Difference, is the difference between the Mexican central bank's 
overnight interest rate and the US federal funds rate. 
G ARCH models allow us to account for heteroskedasticity as a function of lagged 
values of the error and its variance. One of the most common models is a GARCH(l,1): 
2 2 2 ( ~ at = CO£i_ 1 + acr,_ 1 + exp z,y1 (2) 
where the vanance at time t is a function of the previous residual squared e;_ 1 (the 
ARCH(l) term, since it shows how previous shocks-such as unanticipated news-affect 
the variance over time), the lagged variance cr;_1 (the GARCH(l) term, since it allows 
volatility to be persistent across time), and a vector of variables z1 (including a constant) 
thought to influence the error variance. GARCH models allow us to examine whether 
tweets affect exchange rate volatility, while allowing them to affect exchange rate value. 
14We use this rather than the Mexican stock market index since the two are highly correlated, and 
vector error-correction models in the SI (pp. 23-25) suggest that the S&P 500 drives the Mexican stock 
market, rather than the reverse. 
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Results 
We begin the statistical analysis by exammmg the impact of Trump's Mexico-related 
tweets ( Tweet Dummy) on the percent change in the USD /MXN exchange rate, in Table 
2, Model 1. We first estimate a dynamic regression with no ARCH effects in Equation 
1, where we assume £1 ~ N(0, a; = cr2) Vt. A Lagrange multiplier test for autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity rejected the null hypothesis of no ARCH process for up to 
five lags in Model 1, suggesting that we should use the GARCH approach to relax the 
assumption that the error variance is constant over time. 15 
[Table 2 about here] 
Given that there appear to be periods of low and high volatility in the USD /MXN 
exchange rate (Figure 1), we next examine the effect of Trump's tweets on the USD/MXN 
exchange rate using a GARCH(l,1) model that includes one ARCH term £;_1 and one 
GARCH term crL1, shown in Table 2, Model 2. For this model (and all others), we 
ensure that the resulting scaled residuals are white noise using the approach suggested by 
Enders (2010, p. 150). 16 Recall that we suspect that Trump's tweets will have no impact 
on the percentage change in the USD /MXN exchange rate (the "mean equation" in Table 
2). This is the case: Tweet Dummy does not achieve statistical significance in Table 2, 
Model 2, nor does its lag. The parameter on the lagged dependent variable in the mean 
equation in Model 2 is positive but not statistically significant, suggesting that there is 
no persistence in fluctuations in the USD /MXN exchange rate over time. 
Importantly, both the ARCH and GARCH terms in Table 2, Model 2 are statistically 
significant, suggesting that the conditional variance is a function of lagged unanticipated 
shocks (the ARCH effect), as well as the previous value of the conditional variance (the 
GARCH effect). The GARCH parameter is closer to one than to zero, suggesting that 
15The LM statistic was 2.68 (p-value: 0.10), 5.83 (0.054), 27.26 (0.00), 27.23 (0.00), and 27.99 (0.00), 
for the first five lags, respectively. 
16This involved calculating the Ljung-Box Q statistic on the residuals~and residuals squared~scaled 
by the conditional standard deviation to check for remaining autocorrelation and ARCH effects, respec-
tively. All GARCH models fail to reject the null hypothesis of white noise for both tests. 
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the conditional variance is highly persistent over time and days of high (low) volatility 
are followed by days of similarly high (low) volatility. The ARCH term also suggests 
that unanticipated information may affect volatility in the USD /MXN exchange rate. 
To ascertain whether Trump's Mexico-related tweets affect USD /MXN exchange rate 
volatility, we next examine their impact on both value and volatility in the USD /MXN 
exchange rate in Table 2, Model 3. We include dummy variables for the US election 
cycle periods, as well as two macroeconomic variables-the S&P 500 and 10-year bond 
spreads-since they might affect volatility as well. The results for the mean equation 
show that Tweet Dummy has no impact on the value of the USD /MXN exchange rate. 
The results for the variance equation show that Tweet Dummy also has no statistically 
significant effect on conditional variance during the day in which a Mexico-related tweet 
occurs, at least across the entire sample. 
To test the competing hypotheses, however, we must examine the impact of Trump's 
tweets on the USD /MXN exchange rate by different periods during the government se-
lection process, in order to distinguish periods when investors would have been searching 
Trump's Mexico-related tweets for information about his policy direction, policy resolve, 
or neither of the two. We thus add interactions between our dichotomous Tweet Dummy 
variable and each of the US presidential election period dummy variables to both the 
mean and the variance equations in Table 2, Model 4. In the mean equation, the interac-
tion terms are not statistically significant, as expected, with the exception of the negative 
coefficient for term capturing the period after Trump became president, suggesting that 
post-inauguration tweets might have raised peso value. 
However, in Table 2, Model 4's variance equation, we observe two time periods during 
which Trump's Mexico-related tweets drove substantial increases in USD /MXN exchange 
rate volatility: after Trump secured the GOP nomination and after he was elected US 
president but before he took office. These are periods during which Trump's policy views 
would have been widely known. Even so, the coefficients in the variance equation cannot 
be easily interpreted because they affect variance in multiplicative exponentiated form 
(see Equation 2). We thus developed a new technique to probe the impact of Trump's 
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tweets on USD /MXN exchange rate volatility based on stochastic simulation methods and 
created plots of the expected conditional error variance over time. Stochastic simulation 
methods have been developed to assess statistical and substantive significance of time 
series models (e.g., Williams and Whitten 2011; Jordan and Philips 2018a,b) but we are 
the first to extend this approach to GARCH models. Full details of our innovation are 
available in the SI (p. 3). 
Figure 3 shows the posterior densities of 6000 simulated predictions of the expected 
conditional error variance over time from Table 2, Model 4, setting all continuous variables 
to their means and assuming that a tweet occurs on the third day (t = 3) and on that 
day only. During the GOP nominee and president-elect periods-the two periods with 
positive and significant coefficients in the variance equation-Trump's tweets produced 
a statistically significant increase in USD /MXN exchange rate volatility, with this effect 
taking over a week to dissipate thanks to the large GARCH effect. Since variance is 
strictly positive, the confidence intervals exhibit upward-skew behavior, as can be seen on 
the fourth day (t = 4). Figure 3 thus shows that Trump's Mexico-related tweets raised 
USD /MXN volatility after he became the GOP nominee and that this volatility continued 
after he became president-elect, periods when Trump's Mexico-related policy views would 
have been known to investors. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Because we argue that repeated, consistent policy promises raise the costs of pol-
icy deviation, thereby raising evidence of politicians' policy resolve, we must also show 
that greater tweet intensity-captured in terms of frequency and tone-leads to greater 
investor adjustments and greater peso volatility. We thus conduct three additional anal-
yses. First, we create an ordinal tweet variable to capture whether there were none (0), 
one (1), or two or more (2) tweets in a day. 17 As above, we find no evidence in Table 
3, Model 5 that tweets affect exchange rate value or exchange rate volatility across the 
entire sample. However, in Table 3, Model 6- depicted in Figure 4- we see that there is 
17Models with additional orders would not converge. 
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a statistically significant increase in volatility when Trump posts Mexico-related tweets 
after he became the GOP nominee as well as after he became president-elect, with this 
effect greatest on days when there were two or more tweets. Figure 4's "Pre-candidate" 
plot also reveals a small increase in volatility associated with Mexico-related tweets in the 
pre-primary period, with this effect greatest where there were two or more Mexico-related 
tweets. Moreover, the increase in volatility takes over a week to dissipate due to the large 
GARCH term. Greater numbers of Mexico-related tweets thus led to greater USD /MXN 
exchange rate volatility during periods when Trump's policy views were unclear as well 
as when they were known. 
[Table 3 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Second, we examine "retweets"-when a user reposts a tweet from another source 
to their followers-and "favorites"-when a user expresses agreement with a tweet from 
another source, two continuous measures. Retweets averaged 3,700 and favorites 9,860 
across the sample (see the SI (pp. 3-4) for time series plots.) Retweets and favorites should 
matter to peso volatility, since such secondary sources would have provided additional 
information to investors. Retweets and favorites might also serve as a proxy for the 
extent to which investors act on Trump's policy tweets. Table 3, Models 7 and 8 show 
the impact of the log number of retweets of Trump's Mexico-related tweets (i.e., where 
the tweet variable equals the log of retweets, zero otherwise) on the USD/MXN exchange 
rate. 18 Table 3, Models 9 and 10 show the impact of favorites of Trump's Mexico-related 
tweets on the USD /MXN exchange rate. 
Using our stochastic simulation technique, Figure 5 presents the expected value of 
volatility under two scenarios using our continuous retweet measure from Table 3, Model 
8. A Mexico-related tweet with the average number of retweets produced substantial 
increases in volatility during the "GOP Nominee" and "President-Elect" periods. This 
18If multiple Mexico-related tweets occurred on the same day, we took the average number of retweets. 
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effect is even stronger among tweets that had retweets in the 90th percentile (about 
27,500). Figure 6 shows the results using the continuous favorites measure from Table 3, 
Model 10. Mexico-related tweets with the average and the 90th percentile (about 111,000) 
favorites also affected USD /MXN exchange rate volatility after Trump became the "GOP 
Nominee" and "President-Elect." Economic policy news thus appears to affect financial 
markets most when investors are paying greatest attention to it. 
Figures 5 and 6 also reveal that USD /MXN exchange rate volatility rose in response to 
retweets and favorites during the "Pre-candidate" period, as found with ordinal tweet in-
tensity. Investors thus updated their views about the possible future direction of Trump's 
Mexico-related policy in response to his tweets prior to the GOP primaries, although this 
effect was small because he was still an unlikely contender and unlikely presidential victor 
at this point. In sum, peso volatility rose in response to greater numbers of Mexico-related 
retweets and favorites, both before Trump's policy views were known ( during the "Pre-
Candidate" period)-as investors responded to news about his policy direction-and after 
(during the "GOP Nominee" and "President-Elect" periods)-as investors responded to 
news about his policy resolve-in line with our argument. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
[Figure 6 about here] 
Third, we examine the tone of Trump's Mexico-related tweets. Investors might pay 
more attention to tweets that are particularly negative. We create a new "Tweet" variable 
equal to one if the net tone of a tweet is negative, zero otherwise, using the sentiment 
analysis package syuzhet (Jockers 2015) .19 The results in Table 4, Models 11 and 12 
are similar to those above: particularly negative tweets raise volatility during the "GOP 
Nominee" and "President-Elect" periods. We also examine tweets coded as "positive." 
In contrast to "negative" tweets-which tended to be anti-Mexican-"positive" tweets 
tended to be pro-US. For example, the 24 February 2015 tweet "The Mexican legal system 
19We use a dichotomous rather than continuous measure due to convergence issues, although continuous 
results are available in the SI (pp. 9-11). 
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is corrupt, as is much of Mexico. Pay me the money that is owed me now-and stop sending 
criminals over our border" is coded as negative, whereas the 6 June 2015 tweet "Just made 
the point at #NCGOPcon that we have to protect our border & I think everyone here 
knows, nobody can build a wall like Trump!" is coded as positive. Table 4, Models 13 and 
14 show that tweets with a net positive sentiment affect volatility as above, with nearly the 
same magnitude. These results are robust to other sentiment codings in the SI (pp. 9-11 ). 
Peso volatility thus rose in response to Mexico-related tweets with stronger sentiment, 
after his policy views were known (during the "GOP Nominee" and "President-Elect" 
periods), in line with expectations. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Figures 4, 5, and 6 also suggest that, once Trump took office in January 2017, his 
Mexico-related tweets may have lowered USD /MXN exchange rate volatility, although 
this effect is not statistically significant. At first glance, this suggests that investors were 
no longer gathering information about his Mexico-related policy direction or resolve, with 
both having been established by this time. At second glance, the time period covered (21 
January 2016 to 2 February 2018) may be too broad. The impact of Trump's Mexico-
related tweets on peso volatility during his presidency may have had different effects, 
depending on progress in NAFTA rounds with Mexico or budgetary negotiations with 
Congress on border wall funding. The results also show that the US Presidential Election 
reduced the value of the Mexican peso across all models, although NAFTA negotiations 
had no effect. Banxico US $ Sales to defend the peso had no effect, although rising 
Overnight Rate Difference contributed to rising peso value. Neither the S€3P 500 nor the 
US-Mexico Bond Spread appears to have affected Mexican peso value, although they both 
affected peso volatility (negatively and positively, respectively). The ARCH-in-Mean term 
is negative and statistically significant across nearly all models, suggesting that increased 
volatility one day results in a stronger peso the next. 
That our different tweet measures produced the same results-including those for the 
GOP primary interlude where we expected no effect- strengthens our conclusion that 
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investors reacted to Trump's pre-primary tweets as a source of news about his likely 
policy direction and his post-GOP nominee and post-election tweets as a source of news 
about his likely policy resolve. Had the competing argument found support, we would 
have observed only pre-candidate period volatility. 
Alternative Arguments and Robustness 
The impact of Trump's Mexico-related policy tweets on USD /MXN exchange rate volatil-
ity after Trump's official GOP nomination might be due to their role in providing news 
about his Mexico-related policy goals instead of news about his resolve in seeing them im-
plemented. Yet, Trump's Mexico-related tweets, retweets, and favorites raised USD /MXN 
exchange rate volatility after his 8 November 2016 election victory. Even if investors had 
only been informed about Trump's Mexico-related views via Twitter during the US pres-
idential campaign, they would have been fully informed by his presidential victory. The 
impact of Trump's tweets on peso volatility after the presidential race could only be the 
result of their role in providing information about his policy resolve. It could also be 
that the impact of Trump's tweets was driven by irrational, uninformed "noise" traders 
(Black 1986) reacting to his tweets without consideration of their content. However, that 
Trump's tweets did not rattle the peso during the GOP primary shows that rational, 
informed investors dominated the peso market. 
There could also be a mismatch between the time tweets are sent and when they 
are examined by investors. The Mexican peso is traded from Sunday 5:00PM Eastern 
Standard Time (EST) to Friday 5:00PM EST, but most trades occur during New York 
and London market hours. If Trump tweets after these markets close, they may impact 
USD /MXN volatility the next day. We deploy two additional tweet codings in Table 5. 
Models 15 and 16 examine 7:00-21:00 UTC (3:00AM - 5:00PM EST), when either the 
London or New York markets are open, with later tweets coded the following day. Models 
17 and 18 examine 12:00-16:00 UTC (8:00AM - 12:00PM EST), when both markets are 
open, with later tweets coded the next day. The 7:00-21:00 UTC results are nearly 
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identical to those above. The 12:00-16:00 UTC results are similar but not statistically 
significant, probably due to the brevity of the period. 
[Table 5 about here] 
We provide additional evidence of the robustness of our findings in the SI. Tweets dis-
aggregated by trade and immigration produce similar results, with topics usually consid-
ered within the foreign policy realm (immigration) affecting financial markets (pp. 11-13). 
Prediction market data on the probability of Trump's presidential victory show that his 
tweets mattered more to USD /MXN exchange rate volatility when his chance of winning 
was less clear, mostly in the months leading up to the election (i.e., the "GOP nomi-
nee" period) (pp. 6-8). Various "placebo" tweet subjects-like China or Ted Cruz-do 
not affect the peso (pp. 15-17). Future research might examine whether Trump's Mexico-
related tweets also affect NAFTA partner Canada or whether China-specific tweets matter 
to that nation's currency. We find that tweets affect Mexican-US bond spreads, but not 
the Mexican stock market (pp. 17-20). Future work might address this difference using 
a small-scale model (e.g., Sattler, Brandt and Freeman 2010), as well as incorporating 
GARCH terms in a vector autoregressive approach (Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge 
1988). Alternative exchange rate measures-the percentage change daily high or daily 
low-produce similar results (pp. 13-14). 
Conclusion 
The original aim of this study was to contribute to research on politics and financial 
markets but it also contributes to research on politics and social media. Politicians use 
social media to disseminate campaign information, establish issue positions, competence, 
and reputations, and to engage in policy debates (Gainous and Wagner 2013; Parmelee 
2014; Stier et al. 2018). This allows citizens to hold politicians accountable (Vanhommerig 
and Karre 2014; Kang et al. 2018), by establishing a benchmark against which performance 
can be compared. We argue that politicians' social media policy posts are similarly useful 
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to investors. Not only do social media posts allow investors to determine the likely 
future policy direction of government, they allow investors to gather information on the 
benchmark against which politicians seek to be evaluated and thus on politicians' level of 
resolve to implement their policy goals. 
We also contribute to research on social media and financial markets. Social media 
is unmediated (Gainous and Wagner 2013), enhancing its usefulness to investors seeking 
unfiltered, timely information. Financial economists have examined the impact of headline 
news from traditional media outlets on financial markets (e.g., Baker, Bloom and Davis 
2016) but headline news is often driven by the social media posts of political players 
(Gainous and Wagner 2013; Parmelee 2014; Kreiss 2016). Traditional media headlines 
thus might not contain much political news. Although scholars have begun to examine 
how social media posts by important financial market players affect market dynamics 
(Pineiro-Chousa, Vizcaino-Gonzalez and Perez-Pico 2017; Li, van Dalen and van Rees 
2018; Gholampour and van Wincoop 2017), they have not yet examined how posts by 
political players might also matter to investors. 20 Our research shows this is the case. 
20 An exception is Born, Myers and Clark (2017). 
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Table 2: ARCH Effects and GARCH(l,1) Models Using Tweet Dummy 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mean Equation 
Pct. Pesor-1 0.036 (0.039) 0.013 (0.043) 0.006 (0.040) 0.007 (0.039) 
Tweet Dummy1 0.012 (0.062) -0.001 (0.059) -0.023 (0.058) 
S&P 5001_1 0.078* (0.041) 0.060 (0.043) 0.064 (0.044) 0.065 (0.043) 
Bond Spread1- 1 0.045* (0.023) 0.034 (0.023) 0.030 (0.023) 0.028 (0.023) 
fl ln(Banxico US$ Stock1) 17.948 (17.842) 11.572 (16.271) 12.695 (16.615) 11.320 (16.715) 
fl Overnight Rate Diff1 -1.095* (0.580) -1.269** (0.590) -1.277** (0.615) -1.278** (0.625) 
Banxico US$ Sales1 0.162** (0.069) 0.106* (0.064) 0.079 (0.065) 0.064 (0.066) 
US Presidential Election1 -1.558* (0. 797) -1.548 (2.265) -1.563 (1.072) -1.518 (1.099) 
US Presidential Election1_1 8.398*** (0. 798) 9. 722*** ( 1.283) 8.389*** ( 1.169) 8.4 71*** (1.196) 
Trump Primary Candidate1 0.055 (0.088) 0.046 (0.080) 0.062 (0.089) 0.010 (0.107) 
Trump GOP Nominee, 0.089 (0.121) 0.033 (0.123) 0.102 (0.151) 0.096 (0.170) 
President-Elect1 0.203 (0.137) 0.187 (0.133) 0.266 (0.182) 0.197 (0.175) 
Trump Presidency, -0.035 (0.092) -0.067 (0.083) -0.109 (0.089) -0.085 (0.110) 
NAFTA Rounds1 0.169 (0.188) 0.168 (0.161) 0.202 (0.153) 0.223 (0.153) 
Tweet Dummy1 x Pre-Candidate1 -0.061 (0.156) 
Tweet Dummyr x Primary Candida ter 0.072 (0.094) 
Tweet Dummy1 x GOP Nominee1 0.144 (0.217) 
Tweet Dummy1 x President-Elect1 0.401 (0.368) 
Tweet Dummy1 x Presidency1 -0.156* (0.091) 
Constant -0.064 (0.083) 0.137 (0.125) 0.256 (0.15 7) 0.294* (0.176) 
ARCH-in-Mean1_1 -0.272 (0.196) -0.441 * (0.255) -0.482* (0.268) 
Variance Equation 
ARCH(l) 0.099*** (0.033) 0.055** (0.026) 0.046* (0.025) 
GARCH(l) 0. 754*** (0.071) 0.822*** (0.058) 0.840*** (0.051) 
Tweet Dummy1 -0.340 (0.512) 
Trump Primary Candidate1 0.030 (0.228) 
Trump GOP Nominee1 0.415 (0.281) 
President-Elect1 0.119 (0.382) 
Trump Presidency1 -0.085 (0.220) 
Tweet Dummy1 x Pre-Candidate1 -0.333 (0.969) 
Tweet Dummy1 x Primary Candida te1 -0.436 (0.683) 
Tweet Dummy1 x GOP Nominee1 0.972** (0.431) 
Tweet Dummy1 x President-Elect1 1.088* (0.617) 
Tweet Dummy1 x Presidency1 -0.594 (0.576) 
S&P 5001-1 -0.294 (0.234) -0.422** (0.166) 
Bond Spread1-1 0.332*** (0.088) 0.335*** (0.076) 
Constant 0.091 *** (0.032) -2. 706*** (0.430) -2.848*** (0.410) 
AIC 1910.45 1894.20 1891.23 1889.09 
Ljung Box-Q of~ 0.601 0.543 0.624 
Ljung Box-Q of (? )2 0.060 0.225 0.744 
Note: Dependent variable is daily percentage change in USD/ MXN exchange rate. T = 804. Standard 
errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Figure 3: Predictions from Table 2, Model 4 
Note: Expected means shown with 95 percent confidence intervals. Tweet occurs at t = 3. 
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Table 3: Intensity of Tweets , Weighting by Retweets a nd Favorites 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
0, 1, 2+ 0, 1, 2+ Weight by Weight by Weight by Weight by 
Tweets Tweet s ln(Retweet) ln(Retweet) ln(Fa vorite) ln(Favorite) 
Mean Equation 
P ct. Peso,- 1 0.007 (0.040) 0.010 (0.039) 0.007 (0.040) 0.007 (0.039) 0.007 (0.040) 0.007 (0.039) 
Tweet, -0.014 (0.039) -0.003 (0.007) -0.003 (0.006) 
S&P 500,- 1 0.067 (0.043) 0.068 (0.043) 0 069 (0.043) 0.069 (0.043) 0.070 (0.043) 0.070 (0.043) 
Bond Spread,- 1 0.030 (0.023) 0.030 (0.023) 0.030 (0.023) 0028 (0.023) 0.030 (0.023) 0028 (0.023) 
1',_ ln(Banxico US$ Stock, ) 12.809 (16.656) 11.535 (16.646) 12.495 (16.651) 10.832 (16.770) 12.519 (16 .654) 10.764 (16.760) 
1',_ Overnight Rate Diff, -1250** (0.615) -1.256** (0.622) -1 219** (0.615) -1.227** (0.618) -1.212** (0.615) -1218** (0.617) 
Banx ico US$ Sales, 0078 (0.066) 0.058 (0.067) 0.085 (0.065) 0.074 (0.066) 0.087 (0.065) 0.074 (0.066) 
US Presidential Election, -1562 (1.064) -1.540 (1101) -1.565 (1.040) -1527 (1.065) -1.566 (1037) -1.530 (1.061) 
US Presidential Election,_1 8.395*** (1165) 8.497*** (1.214) 8.401*** (1146) 8.483*** (1163) 8.403*** (1145) 8.477*** (1160) 
Trump Primary Candidate, 0.062 (0.090) 0.002 (0.105) 0.068 (0.093) 0.040 (0.109) 0 069 (0.094) 0 039 (0.109) 
Trump GOP Nominee, 0.107 (0.153) 0 090 (0.165) 0.130 (0.155) 0.147 (0.172) 0.134 (0.155) 0.136 (0.171) 
President-Elect, 0.271 (0.187) 0.158 (0.170) 0.290 (0.195) 0. 232 (0.177) 0.292 (0.196) 0.230 (0.176) 
Trump Presidency, -0.115 (0.089) -0 093 (0.106) -0.115 (0.092) -0.072 (0.107) -0.115 (0.092) -0.073 (0.108) 
NAFTA Rounds, 0.198 (0.153) 0.213 (0.151) 0. 206 (0.154) 0.224 (0.152) 0.208 (0.154) 0.230 (0.152) 
Tweet,x -0.037 (0.109) -0.006 (0.033) -0.007 (0.031) 
Pre-Candidate, 
Tweet,x 0.048 (0.057) 0.011 (0.012) 0.010 (0.011) 
Primary Candidate, 
Tweet,x 0.074 (0.152) 0.013 (0.024) 0.014 (0.021) 
GOP Nominee, 
Tweet,x 0.400 (0.282) 0.039 (0.037) 0.034 (0.032) 
President-Elect, 
Tweet,x -0.129** (0.062) -0.016* (0.009) -0.015' (0.008) 
Presidency, 
Constant 0. 276* (0.152) 0.305* (0.161) 0.307** (0.147) 0.311* (0.161) 0.312** (0.146) 0.314* (0.163) 
ARCH-in-Mean,- 1 -0.473* (0.251) -0.481 ' (0.248) -0.536** (0.243) -0.558** (0.252) -0.545** (0.242) -0 .559** (0.253) 
Variance Equation 
ARCH(l) 0.053** (0.025) 0.048* (0.025) 0.050** (0.024) 0.044* (0.024) 0.050** (0.024) 0.044* (0.024) 
GARCH(l) 0.831*** (0.055) 0.843*** (0.049) 0.833*** (0.055) 0.838*** (0.050) 0.835*** (0.055) 0.838*** (0.050) 
Tweet, -0.184 (0.342) -0.008 (0.047) -0.003 (0.041) 
Trump Primary Candidate, 0.020 (0.229) 0.001 (0.234) -0 008 (0.233) 
Trump GOP Nominee, 0.410 (0.283) 0.401 (0.289) 0 394 (0.288) 
President-Elect, 0.114 (0.386) 0.140 (0.390) 0.134 (0.391) 
Trump Presidency, -0 091 (0.220) -0.QQ0 (0.231) -0099 (0.230) 
Tweet,x -0.084 (0.668) -0.077 (0. 207) -0.059 (0.180) 
Pre-Candidate, 
Tweet, x -0.263 (0.431) -0.017 (0.074) -0.012 (0.068) 
Primary Candidate, 
Tweet, x 0.684** (0.281) 0. 111** (0.043) 0.101** (0.040) 
GOP Nominee, 
Tweet,x 0.900* (0.501) 0.107* (0.059) 0.095* (0.052) 
President-Elect, 
Tweet ,x -0.477 (0.480) -0.053 (0.054) -0.045 (0.049) 
Presidency, 
S&P 500,-1 -0.320 (0.216) -0429** (0.172) -0.323 (0.204) -0.387** (0.164) -0.327 (0. 201) -0.389** (0.164) 
Bond Spread,- 1 0.336*** (0.088) 0.332*** (0.079) 0.333*** (0.089) 0.334*** (0.073) 0.334*** (0.089) 0.337*** (0.073) 
Constant -2.789*** (0.410) -2.904*** (0.391) -2.835*** (0.418) -2.842*** (0.381) -2.850*** (0418) -2.861 *** (0.389) 
AIC 189144 1887.35 189166 188941 1891 58 1889 33 
Ljung Box-Q of t 0.54 0.72 0.59 0.71 0.59 0.71 
Ljung Box-Q of ( ' ' )2 0.29 0.88 0.28 0.72 0.28 0.67 
Note: Dependent variable is daily percentage change in USD / MXN exchange rate. T = 804. St andard 
errors in parent heses. Two-t a iled t ests. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
37 
.8 







.5 .6 C 
ro 
...... f • ·;:: •• •' •' .. ...... .+ .. .35 ...... + 
' . . . . 
~ A ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦• ♦• •' •• ,._ A 0 .3 .3 ,._ ,._ 
0 6 12 9 12 3 6 9 12 w 
<ii Day Day Day 
C 
0 
:~ 2.5 President-Elect AS President ,:, 






u 1.5 u 
Cl) 
Q. 
X 35 w 
■ ■ 
.5 - - _ t ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ •••••••• ■ .. .3 
0 3 9 12 9 12 
Day Day 
Figure 4: Coding the Intensity of 1\veets (Model 6) 
Note: Expected means shown with 95 percent confidence intervals. Blue circles indicate 1 tweet; Red 
squares indicate 2+ tweets. Tweet occurs at t = 3. Time slightly staggered for clarity. 
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Figure 5: Weighting by ln(Retweet) (Model 8) 
6 
Day 
Note: Expected means shown with 95 percent confidence intervals. Blue circles depict a tweet with 
average number of retweets; Red squares depict 90th percentile of retweets. Time slightly staggered 
across two scenarios for clarity. 
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Figure 6: Weighting by ln(Favorites) 
.7 
3 6 9 
Day 
Note: Expected means shown with 95 percent confidence intervals. Blue circles depict a tweet with 
average number of favorites; Red squares depict 90th percentile of favorites. Time slightly staggered 
across two scenarios for clarity. 
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Table 4: Tone of Tweets 
(11) (12) (13) (14) 
Negative Negative Positive Positive 
Sentiment Tweets Sentiment Tweets Sentiment Tweets Sentiment Tweets 
Mean Equation 
Pct. Peso1-1 0.004 (0.040) 0.006 (0.039) 0.009 (0.039) 0.016 (0.039) 
Tweet1 0.028 (0.038) -0.067* (0.037) 
S&P 5001-1 0.062 (0.043) 0.066 (0.043) 0.067 (0.042) 0.067 (0.042) 
Bond Spread1-1 0.032 (0.023) 0.028 (0.023) 0.031 (0.023) 0.033 (0.023) 
Li ln(Banxico US$ Stock1) 11.772 (16.563) 11.643 (16.675) 17.115 (17.081) 12.989 (16. 749) 
Li Overnight Rate Diff1 -1.286** (0.607) -1.283** (0.624) -1.176* (0.640) -1.248** (0.637) 
Banxico US$ Sales1 0.061 (0.064) 0.056 (0.066) 0.074 (0.065) 0.054 (0.065) 
US Presidential Election1 -1.552 (1.078) -1.480 (1.127) -1.544 (1.067) -1.562 (1.046) 
US Presidential Election1_ 1 8.385*** (1.162) 8.515*** (1.217) 8.379*** (1.127) 8.392*** (1.103) 
President-Elect1 0.237 (0.174) 0.226 (0.171) 0.291 (0.194) 0.172 (0.175) 
Trump Presidency1 -0.124 (0.087) -0.114 (0.088) -0.120 (0.088) -0.076 (0.093) 
Trump Primary Candidate1 0.032 (0.088) 0.025 (0.096) 0.062 (0.088) 0.016 (0.096) 
Trump GOP Nominee1 0.064 (0.145) 0.144 (0.164) 0.116 (0.144) 0.026 (0.141) 
NAFTA Rounds1 0.197 (0.154) 0.188 (0.154) 0.179 (0.149) 0.209 (0.153) 
Tweet1 x Pre-Candidate1 -0.014 (0.232) -0.063 (0.159) 
Tweet1 x Primary Candidate1 0.099 (0.102) 0.043 (0.103) 
Tweet1x GOP Nominee1 0.133 (0.265) 0.220 (0.288) 
Tweet1 x President-Elect1 0.808 (0.660) 0.486 (0.391) 
Tweet1 x Presidency1 -0.025 (0.118) -0.250** (0.106) 
Constant 0.245* (0.135) 0.298** (0.128) 0.284** (0.139) 0.233* (0.123) 
ARCH-in-Mean1-1 -0.400* (0.211) -0.505** (0.231) -0.460** (0.217) -0.359* (0.189) 
Variance Equation 
ARCH(l) 0.055** (0.026) 0.043* (0.023) 0.037* (0.020) 0.042* (0.022) 
GARCH(l) 0.821*** (0.058) 0.853*** (0.042) 0.884*** (0.041) 0.868*** (0.044) 
Tweet1 -0.310 (0.281) -1.429 (1.692) 
Trump Primary Candidate1 0.074 (0.226) -0.019 (0.226) 
Trump GOP Nominee1 0.447 (0.284) 0.378 (0.287) 
President-Elect1 0.134 (0.381) 0.104 (0.394) 
Trump Presidency1 -0.069 (0.221) -0.110 (0.228) 
Tweet1 x Pre-Candidate1 -1.325 ( 4.679) -2.123 (5.503) 
Tweet1 x Primary Candidate1 -0.476 (0.887) -1. 755 (1.652) 
Tweet1xGOP Nominee1 1.351 *** (0.412) 1.156* (0.614) 
Tweet1 x President-Elect1 1.620** (0.684) 1.545** (0.778) 
Tweet1 x Presidency1 -0.703 (1.121) -1.508 (2.158) 
S&P 5001-1 -0.297 (0.234) -0.436*** (0.162) -0.474** (0.200) -0.500*** (0.166) 
Bond Spread1-1 0.346*** (0.088) 0.341 *** (0.079) 0.330*** (0.089) 0.349*** (0.081) 
Constant -2. 768*** (0.398) -2.992*** (0.333) -3.089*** (0.399) -3.052*** (0.368) 
AIC 1889.05 1890.49 1887.48 1886.10 
Ljung Box-Q of * 0.55 0.64 0.63 1.08 
Ljung Box-Q of ( ~ )2 0.19 1.43 0.39 0.48 
Note: Dependent variable is daily percentage change in USD/MXN exchange rate. T = 804. Standard 
errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5: Active Trading Times 
(15) (16) (17) (18) 
7:00-21:00 7:00-21:00 12:00-16:00 12:00-16:00 
UTC UTC UTC UTC 
Mean Equation 
Pct. Peso1-1 0.006 (0.040) 0.008 (0.039) 0.008 (0.040) 0.011 (0.039) 
Tweet1 -0.004 (0.058) -0.016 (0.058) 
S&P 5001-1 0.065 (0.044) 0.066 (0.043) 0.067 (0.043) 0.062 (0.042) 
Bond Spread1-1 0.030 (0.023) 0.029 (0.023) 0.030 (0.023) 0.031 (0.023) 
Li ln(Banxico US$ Stock1) 12.439 (16.598) 13.549 (16. 732) 12.986 (16.746) 14.400 (16.820) 
Li Overnight Rate Diff1 -1.268** (0.616) -1.269** (0.626) -1.236** (0.616) -1.261** (0.630) 
Banxico US$ Sales1 0.078 (0.064) 0.065 (0.067) 0.076 (0.063) 0.061 (0.064) 
US Presidential Election1 -1.557 (1.070) -1.602 (1.088) -1.556 (1.070) -1.629 (1.065) 
US Presidential Election1_ 1 8.395*** (1.171) 8.469*** (1.170) 8.374*** (1.142) 8.413*** (1.108) 
Trump Primary Candidate1 0.059 (0.089) -0.003 (0.107) 0.061 (0.087) -0.023 (0.102) 
Trump GOP Nominee1 0.101 (0.152) 0.167 (0.167) 0.095 (0.144) 0.123 (0.157) 
President-Elect1 0.267 (0.184) 0.194 (0.177) 0.269 (0.178) 0.156 (0.174) 
Trump Presidency1 -0.112 (0.089) -0.099 (0.109) -0.105 (0.088) -0.110 (0.102) 
NAFTA Rounds1 0.198 (0.153) 0.210 (0.152) 0.196 (0.152) 0.203 (0.154) 
Tweet1 x Pre-Candidate1 -0.063 (0.157) -0.106 (0.153) 
Tweet1 x Primary Candidate1 0.120 (0.095) 0.075 (0.091) 
Tweet1x GOP Nominee1 -0.133 (0.221) -0.196 (0.219) 
Tweet1 x President-Elect1 0.407 (0.369) 0.617 (0.383) 
Tweet1 x Presidency1 -0.106 (0.091) -0.090 (0.093) 
Constant 0.260 (0.161) 0.292* (0.177) 0.237 (0.147) 0.251 * (0.150) 
ARCH-in-Mean1-1 -0.453* (0.264) -0.4 78* (0.276) -0.414* (0.228) -0.368* (0.214) 
Variance Equation 
ARCH(l) 0.054** (0.026) 0.043* (0.025) 0.048** (0.023) 0.038* (0.020) 
GARCH(l) 0.824*** (0.059) 0.844 *** (0.051) 0.838*** (0.048) 0.864 *** (0.040) 
Tweet1 -0.257 (0.494) -0.580 (0.638) 
Trump Primary Candidate1 0.019 (0.228) 0.028 (0.220) 
Trump GOP Nominee1 0.406 (0.281) 0.408 (0.277) 
President-Elect1 0.120 (0.385) 0.116 (0.376) 
Trump Presidency1 -0.089 (0.220) -0.081 (0.218) 
Tweet1 x Pre-Candidate1 -0.266 (0.936) -0.601 (1.004) 
Tweet1 x Primary Candidate1 -0.287 (0.667) -1.173 (0.980) 
Tweet1xGOP Nominee1 0.962** (0.431) 0.758 (0.514) 
Tweet1 x President-Elect1 1.119* (0.605) 1.025 (0. 737) 
Tweet1 x Presidency1 -0.528 (0.569) -0.817 (0.799) 
S&P 5001-1 -0.300 (0.233) -0.403** (0.168) -0.343 (0.209) -0.483*** (0.163) 
Bond Spread1-1 0.332*** (0.089) 0.339*** (0.077) 0.329*** (0.087) 0.346*** (0.079) 
Constant -2. 738*** (0.435) -2.879*** (0.414) -2.756*** (0.359) -2.944*** (0.362) 
AIC 1891.57 1890.43 1890.55 1889.56 
Ljung Box-Q of * 0.57 0.71 0.56 0.79 
Ljung Box-Q of ( ~ )2 0.23 0.83 0.28 0.49 
Note: Dependent variable is daily percentage change in USD/MXN exchange rate. T = 804. Standard 
errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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1 Unit Root Tests 
The results of four unit root tests on the main dependent variable, the percentage change in the 
USD-MXN exchange rate, are shown in Table 1. The Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin 
(KPSS) test is based on the null hypothesis that the series is stationary, while the Augmented 
Dicky-Tuller (A-DF) and Dickey-Tuller with a Generalized Least Squares transformation (DF-
GLS) are based on the null hypotheses that the series contains a unit root. Ten augmenting lags 
were included in all tests to mitigate issues from residual autocorrelation. As is clear from Table 
1, taking the percentage change in the USD /MXN exchange rate renders the series stationary, 
which is what we use in our analysis. 




DF-GLS (w / trend) 
DF-GLS (w /o trend) 










Note: T = 795, *: p < 0.05. KPSS has a null hypothesis of stationarity; all others have a null of a non-stationary 
series. Test statistics include 10 augmenting lags in order to purge autocorrelation. 
2 Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics are available in Table 2. 
2.1 Data Sources 
Our data sources are as follows: 
• Data on the Mexican peso are from https: / /www.investing.com/currencies/usd-mxn-historical-
data. As a robustness check, we also com pare these exchange rate data to those from the 
Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED) below. 
• Threet data (including information such as likes, retweets, and the timing of tweets) are 
from the Trump Twitter Archive: http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com and 
https://github.com/bpb27 /trump_tweet_data_archive. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N 
Pct. Peso 0.032 0.847 804 
Tueet (dummy) 0.297 0.457 804 
Tueet (0, 1, 2+ tweets) 0.415 0.693 804 
Tueet ( In ( retweet)) 2.445 3.914 804 
Tueet (ln(favorite) 2.676 4.361 804 
Tueet (7:00-21:00 UTC) 0.299 0.458 804 
Tueet (12:00-16:00 UTC) 0.29 0.454 804 
Tueet (negative sentiment) 0.236 0.644 804 
Tueet (positive sentiment) 0.27 0.697 804 
S&P 500 0.043 0.768 804 
Bond Spread 0.04 1.362 804 
b. ln(Banxico US$ Stock) 0 0.002 804 
b. Overnight rate Difference 0.004 0.048 804 
Banxico US$ Sales 0.303 0.46 804 
President-Elect 0.066 0.248 804 
Presidency 0.336 0.473 804 
Primary Candidate 0.353 0.478 804 
GOP Nominee 0.101 0.301 804 
NAFTA Rounds 0.024 0.152 804 
• Data on the S&P 500 are from https://www.investing.com/indices/us-spx-500-historical-
data. 
• Data on N AFTA hearings, announcements, and rounds are from the US Trade Represen-
tative website's press releases: https://ustr.gov / about-us/policy-offi.ces/press-offi.ce/press-
releases. 
• Data used to calculate the b. overnight rate difference are from Mexico's central bank 
(http://www.banxico.org.mx) and the US Federal Reserve 
(https: / /www .federalreserve.gov). 
• Bond spread data are calculated from Mexican (https:/ /www.investing.com/rates-bonds/mexico-
10-year-historical-data) and US (https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/u.s.-10-year-bond-
yield-historical-data) bond yields. 
• Data on Mexico central bank operations (b. ln(Banxico US$ Stock), Banxico US$ Sales) 
are from Mexico's central bank: http://www.banxico.org.mx. 
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3 Details on Retweets and Favorites Variables 
In Figure 1, we plot the interaction between tweets and the log number of times a tweet is 
retweeted in each of the US electoral cycle periods. There is a substantial amount of variation in 
retweets across time: Trump's Mexico-related tweets received an average of 8.2 logged retweets, 
with a minimum of 2.3 and maximum of 11.4. While it appears that there are many more tweets 
occurring in the Primary Candidate and President periods, both of these periods encompass 
approximately one year, while others, such as the President-Elect or GOP Nominee periods, 
encompass only a few months. 
Pre-Candidate Primary Candidate GOP Nominee 
Timi! TinHI n,uz 
President-Elect President 
T imi! T im11 
Figure 1: Main Independent Variable: Tweet x log(Retweets) 
In Figure 2, we show a time series plot of the interaction between tweets and the log of 
the number of times a tweet is liked/favorited. Although the two plots look similar- the two 
measures are extremely highly correlated at 0.98-in general other Twitter users tend to be 
more likely to favorite one of Donald Trump's tweets rather than retweet it. Similar to retweets, 
there is a substantial amount of variation: Mexico-related tweets receive an average of 9.2 logged 
favorites, with a minimum of 2.9 and maximum of 12.2. 
4 Details on Creating Simulated Predictions 
In the main paper, we present several plots of simulated expected values of the heteroskedastic 
error variances. These figures were created in a manner similar to the popular Zelig and Clarify 
packages (Tomz, Whittenberg and King 2003; Imai, King and Lau 2009)-as well as others 
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Pre-Candidate Primary Candidate GOP Nominee 
IS 
10 
TiMe: Time TiMe 
President-Elect President 
TiMe: Time 
Figure 2: Main Independent Variable: Tweet x log(Favorites) 
developed specifically for time series applications ( e.g., Williams and Whitten 2011; Jordan 
and Philips 2018a,b )-all of which involve using stochastic simulation techniques to assess both 
statistical and substantive significance. As King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000) point out, these 
approaches involve no new assumptions beyond those needed to estimate the original model 
( e.g., the model is correctly specified, the error term is well-behaved). However, to the best of 
our knowledge, we are the first to incorporate this approach for ARCH/GARCH models.1 
After estimating the model, we generated 6000 simulated parameter estimates for both the 
mean and variance equations, drawn from a multivariate normal with means equal to the original 
model estimates, and variance from the estimated variance covariance matrix.2 This incorpo-
rates estimation uncertainty ( each of the 6000 parameter estimates will differ slightly from one 
another), while remaining consistent with the underlying estimated model (King, Tomz and 
Wittenberg 2000). 
With these 6000 simulated model estimates, the next step is to set our covariates in the vari-
ance equation to substantively interesting values and generate expected values of the outcome. 
Recall that the variance equation is given as: 
2 2 2 ( ) at = C0£;_1 + acrt-l + exp Zt''( (1) 
1This approach is not dissimilar to the post-estimation predict, variance in Stata, although we also incor-
porate the heteroskedastic variance component ( which can be obtained in Sta ta using predict , het), as well as 
calculate measures of uncertainty surrounding these predictions through stochastic simulation. 
2 King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000, p. 353) suggest drawing from the entire variance-covariance matrix to 
minimize the potential for error; we do this in our simulations, since both the mean and variance equations are 
simultaneously estimated using a single variance-covariance matrix. 
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We set our independent variables in the variance equation ( the exp( Zt''f) part) to the following 
for the first several values: the lagged percent change in the S&P 500 and bond spreads were 
set to sample means, and the political dummy variables (if present) were set to zero except for 
"Trump as Primary Candidate". All tweet variables and/or interactions were set to zero, and 
we also assume that the ARCH term (£;_1 in Equation 1) is zero throughout the entire period. 
The value of the GARCH term (cr;_1 ) is set to its previous value. Thus, at each subsequent 
time point, the previous value of the expected error variance is used as the prior value. Note 
that since the previous value of the expected error variance at the first time point does not 
exist, it is necessary to perform a "burn-in"-we choose 30 time points-such that the expected 
error variance converges on a stable value before any shocks occur. Such burn-ins are common 
in other stochastic simulations of dynamic models (c.f., Jordan and Philips 2018a,b). Such a 
period can be seen in Figure 3, which shows a plot of all 30 burn-in periods in the left plot. 
The right plot shows the type of figure we present in the main paper, which starts after the 
burn-in period (the start point is shown by the dashed vertical line in the left plot). At t = 3 in 
the right-hand plot in Figure 3, the tweet variable takes on a value of one (or whatever value 
described for the alternative tweet operationalizations such as favorites or retweets). At t = 4, 
the contemporaneous tweet variable reverts back to zero. Fort= 5 tot= 12, the tweet variable 
remain at zero, but due to the GARCH term, some persistence of the tweet shock is still felt in 















++♦~ i : 
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Figure 3: Graphical Illustration of the "Burn-In" Period Necessary to Produce Stable Pre-Shock 
Values 
We plot the mean of the expected values, along with 95 percent confidence intervals cre-
ated using percentiles of the 6000 estimates at each point in time. Note too that since the 
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heteroskedastic variance terms all enter into the variance equation via the exponential link-the 
exp(zty) term in Equation 1-not only will this produce positive values by construction (which 
makes sense given that crf must be strictly positive), confidence intervals will skew upwards 
away from zero. This can be seen in Figure 3, where the mean expected error variance tends to 
be lower than the midpoint distance between the upper and lower confidence intervals. 
4.1 A Note on Modeling Strategy 
Much of our analysis involves GARCH models, which are notorious for their convergence prob-
lems in estimating the maximum likelihood. The most common issue with convergence in our 
estimates centered around "rare" events such as each of the NAFTA rounds (forcing us to 
combine them into a single NAFTA variable). 
Our analysis was conducted in Stata. All GARCH models in our analyses use the observed 
information matrix for calculating the standard errors, rather than the less-common outer prod-
uct of the gradient. While most models converged after several iterations without issue, with 
some we had to set priming values of the ARCH terms to zero, rather than computing priming 
values based on the expected unconditional variance, in order to achieve convergence. We did 
not change the convergence tolerance or iteration methods from the default in Stata. 3 
5 Robustness Checks 
5.1 A Re-Examination of When Tweets Matter 
Although the results in the main paper support our argument, it could be said that Trump's 
propensity to send Mexico-related policy tweets might have been affected by his perceived chance 
of winning. Moreover, investors may have paid more attention to his tweets based on his 
probability of winning, rather than based on what they knew about his policy goals and resolve 
and when they knew it (e.g., GOP primary candidate, GOP nominee, president-elect ... ). 
To address this possibility, we incorporate a measure of Trump's chances of winning from 
the University of Iowa's Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) website into the models.4 We employ a 
winner-take-all measure (i.e., the expected popular vote plurality winner in the 2016 presidential 
3The only exception is for some of the sentiment analysis models in Table 4 below. 
4 https:/ /iemweb.biz.uiowa.edu/markets/data_Presl6.html. 
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election). It is available from 1 January, 2015 until 10 November, 2016. The series is shown in 
the left plot in Figure 4. Trump's probability of winning started around 50 percent and tended to 
slowly decrease as the election neared, with substantial volatility near the election in November 
2016. Since this series clearly contains a downward linear trend across time, in the right plot 
in Figure 4 we show the de-trended series, which is what we use in the analysis below through 
the inclusion of a time trend. Each of the vertical slashes shows important dates; when Trump 
announced his presidential bid (in June 2015), and when he formally won the GOP nomination 
(in July 2016). 
Figure 4: Trump's Likelihood of Winning According to Prediction Markets (Left) and De-
Trended Series (Right) 
Note: Raw series (left) and de-trended series (right). Left-most vertical slash indicates when Trump announces 
presidential bid (June 16, 2015). Right-most slash indicates when he won the GOP nominee (July 19, 2016). 
In Table 3 we show the results of Trump's Mexico-related tweets, now including the prediction 
market data instead of the political dummies. Our sample is much shorter since the prediction 
market data stop after the 2016 presidential election; a number of the variables in our other 
models cannot be estimated in this sample since they come after the election (e.g., NAFTA 
negotiations). Last, since the prediction market series is clearly trending across time-we find 
that the series is trend-stationary-we add linear time trends to both the mean and variance 
equations.5 The results are quite similar to those in the main paper. Tweets do not appear 
to affect changes in the peso, as evidenced by the lack of statistical significance in the mean 
equation in both Models 1 and 2. In contrast, increases in the probability that Trump would win 
tend to lead to devaluations in the value of the peso (meaning positive increases in the percent 
5The Dickey-Fuller G LS test indicated that the series was trend-stationary out to 13 augmenting lags, thus we 
choose to add a linear time trend rather than take the first difference. 
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change in the peso) relative to the dollar. In Model 1, there appears to be no effect of prediction 
markets on volatility, nor do tweets affect volatility, a similar finding in the main paper. 
Table 3: Robustness: Prediction Markets 
(1) (2) 
Mean Equation 
Pct. Pesor-1 0.066 (0.055) 0.045 (0.055) 
Tweet Dummyr 0.036 (0.077) 0.439 (0.477) 
Pct. Prediction Mktr 0.022** (0.011) 0.014 (0.010) 
Tweetr xPct. Prediction Mktr -0.008 (0.012) 
S&P 500r-1 0.063 (0.051) 0.034 (0.048) 
Bond Spreadr-1 0.002 (0.030) 0.020 (0.029) 
~ ln(Banxico US$ Stockr) 17.019 (18.334) 5.577 (19.211) 
~ Overnight Rate Differencer -2.065* (1.135) -2.827** (1.114) 
Banxico US$ Salest 0.082 (0.089) 0.186* (0.095) 
US Presidential Electionr -2.468** (1.106) -2.230 (2.535) 
US Presidential Electionr-1 9.003*** (0.981) 7.605*** (2.530) 
Time Trend 0.002*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Constant -0.753 (0.530) -0.902* (0.513) 
ARCH-in-Meant-1 -0.850** (0.355) 0.240 (0.202) 
Variance Equation 
ARCH(l) 0.006 (0.022) 0.028 (0.044) 
GARCH(l) 0.837*** (0.047) 0.796*** (0.104) 
Tweet Dummyt 0.066 (0.319) 6.307*** (1.324) 
Pct. Prediction Mktt 0.009 (0.018) 0.093*** (0.024) 
Tweett xPct. Prediction Mktt -0.175*** (0.034) 
S&P 500t-1 -0.177 (0.121) -0.511 ** (0.241) 
Bond Spreadt- 1 0.511 *** (0.106) -0.342* (0.189) 
Time Trend 0.002** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Constant -3.459*** (1.026) -6.747*** (1.360) 
N 483 483 
Note: Dependent variable is daily percentage change in USD/MXN exchange rate. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Two-tailed tests. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
In Model 2 in Table 3, we interact the tweet measure with the prediction market variable. 
While the interaction is not statistically significant in terms of the value of the exchange rate, 
it is statistically significant and negative in the variance equation. Moreover, the coefficient on 
tweets themselves in the variance equation is positive, quite large in magnitude, and statistically 
significant. This indicates that tweets increased volatility, and tended to have the greatest effect 
when it was less certain that Trump would win, according to prediction markets. As evidenced 
by Figure 4, this tended to be closer to the election (i.e., in the GOP nominee period). This 
echoes the findings in the main paper, in that tweets in the GOP nominee period tended to 
affect volatility of the USD /MXN exchange rate the most. 
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5.2 Additional Sentiment Analysis Results 
In the main paper, we used dichotomous measures of either negative or positive tweet sentiment, 
coded using the syuzhet package by Jockers (2017), which uses the syuzhet sentiment dictionary 
( or lexicon) developed by the Nebraska Literary Lab. Words in each tweet are assigned a positive, 
negative, or neutral sentiment, and these are added together to produce a net positive, negative, 
or neutral tweet overall. We then turned these into dichotomous positive or negative tweets in 
the main paper. We chose this dichotomous measure because continuous measures were sparse 
and created substantial convergence difficulties in the ARCH/GARCH models. 
In this section, we show several additional results using an alternative package, sentimentr 
(Rinker 2019).6 Unlike syuzhet, sentimentr incorporates valence shifters that magnify posi-
tive or negative sentiment; for instance, "is very bad" is more negative than "is bad". Thus, 
sentimentr amplifies or deamplifies (or even negates) sentiment based on the surrounding words 
and context. In Table 4, Models 1 and 2, we show the same positive and negative dichotomous 
tweet codings using sentimentr. 7 The results are quite similar to those using syuzhet in the 
main paper; tweets with either positive or negative sentiment affect volatility in the peso-largely 
at similar magnitudes-but only during the GOP Nominee and Primary Candidate periods. 
In Models 3 through 5 we create continuous measures of sentiment to test whether more 
negative ( or positive) tweets affect volatility to a greater extent. As is clear from the sometimes-
large coefficients and standard errors, these models faced considerable convergence issues. In 
fact, we were not able to get the continuous negative sentiment model using sentimentr to 
converge at all. However, Models 3, 4, and 5 do shed some light on whether more negative 
or positive tweets influence exchange rates. In Model 3, the tweet variable now takes on the 
sentiment value given by the syuzhet package, where higher values indicate more negative 
sentiment. Tweets that are coded as net positive or neutral are set to zero. It appears that 
although the coefficients tend to be in the expected direction, more negative tweets have a 
statistically significant positive effect on volatility only in the GOP Nominee period. In Models 
4 and 5 we test whether more positive tweets affect exchange rates, using both syuzhet and 
sentimentr, respectively. The findings are quite similar t o the continuous negative sentiment 
results; volatility increases when tweets are more positive in sentiment, but only during the 
6 https:/ / github.com/trinker /sentimentr. 
7 Due to convergence issues, the likelihood function in Model 2 was maximized via the Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno algorithm instead of Stata's default settings. 
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Table 4: Additional Sentiment Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Negative Dummy Positive Dummy Continuous Negative Cont inuous Positive Cont inuous Positive 
s.entimentr sentimentr syuzhet syuzhet sentimentr 
Mean Equation 
Pct. Peso,_1 0.010 (0.039) 0.014 (0.039) -0.003 (0.041) 0.013 (0.039) 0.010 (0.040) 
'Iweet, xPre-Candidate, 0.045 (0.211 ) -0.018 (0.164) 0.083 (0.425) -0.183 (0.179) -0.297 (0.840) 
'Iweet, xPrimary Candidate, 0.014 (0.099) 0.031 (0.104) 0.236"' (0.091) 0.008 (0.139) -0.092 (0.526) 
'Iweet, x GOP Nominee, 0.267 (0.261) 0.116 (0.300) -0.000 (0.254) 0.081 (0.275) 0.314 (1.180) 
'Iweet, xPresident-Elect, 0.801 (0.655) 0.490 (0.385 ) 1.255 (2.678) 0.157 (0.261) 0.598 (0.965) 
1\veetr xPresidencyr -0.100 (0.118) -0.223" (0.105) 0.126 (0.085) -0.050 (0.072) -0.112 (0.359) 
S&P 500,_1 0.065 (0.042 ) 0.007 (0.043 ) 0.035 (0.040) 0.065 (0.044) 0.065 (0.045) 
Bond Spread,_, 0.029 (0.023 ) 0.033 (0.G23) 0.G28 (0.023) 0.030 (0.023 ) 0.032 (0.024) 
Li ln(Banxico US$ Stock,) 11.695 (16.575) 12.526 ( 16.691) 11.814 (15.513) 12.468 (16.630) 12.240 (16.615) 
Li Overnight Rate Difference, -1.319" (0.625 ) -1.248" (0.626) -1.322" (0.603) -1.242" (0.624) -1.251" (0.626) 
Banxico US$ Sales, 0.051 (0.065) 0.056 (0.066) 0.067 (0.062) 0.083 (0.064) 0.082 (0.066) 
US Presidential Election, -1.457 (1.140) -1.582 (1.085) -1.581 (1.068) -1.586 (1.016) -1.580 (1.028) 
US Presidential Election,_, 8.502"' (1.244) 8.413'" (1.171) 8.433"' (1.122) 8.366'" ( 1.098) 8.364' " (1.102) 
Trump Primary Candidate, 0.039 (0.093 ) 0.033 (0.097) -0.029 (0.082) 0.059 (0.093) 0.054 (0.095) 
Trump GOP Nominee, 0.096 (0.158) 0.056 (0.140) 0.094 (0.140) 0.060 (0.136) 0.043 (0.130) 
President-Elect, 0.219 (0.166) 0.171 (0.172) 0.187 (0.142) 0.229 (0.174) 0.216 (0.172) 
Trump Presidency, -0.097 (0.088) -0.074 (0.094) -0.120 (0.085) -0.100 (0.087) -0.108 (0.089) 
NAFTA Rounds, 0.194 (0.155) 0.209 (0.152) 0.214 (0.160) 0.208 (0.155) 0.199 (0.155) 
Constant 0.276" (0.122) 0.223' (0.127) 0.199' (0.115) 0.255" (0.128) 0.232 (0.143) 
ARCH-in-Mean -0.461" (0.202) -0.360' (0.190) -0.318" (0.158) -0.439" (0.219) -0.392' (0.238) 
Variance Equation 
ARCH(l) 0.048" (0.022 ) 0.049' (0.026) 0.101" (0.039) 0.051" (0.026) 0.052' (0.028) 
GARCH(l ) 0.852'" (0.041) 0.855"' (0.052) 0.653'" (0.120) 0.838"' (0.055) 0.831 '" (0.073) 
'Iweet, xPre-Candidate, -1.148 (3.133) -1.919 (5.763 ) -135.190 (968.227) -5.124 (16.139) -6.739 (15.883) 
'Iweet, x Primary Candidat e, -0.961 (1.071) -1.399 (1.498) -4.504 (4.374) -0.244 (0.941 ) -2.763 ( 11.407) 
'Iweet, xGOP Nominee, 1.293"' (0.456) 1.276" (0.557) 0.835"' (0.323) 1.118" (0.517) 4.159" (1.736) 
'Iweet, xPresident-Elect, 1.605" (0.713) 1.481' (0.812 ) 4.796 (5.834) 0.501 (0.898) 1.368 (4.007) 
1\veetr xPresidency1 -0.559 (1.076) -1.461 (2.061) -0.862 (1.074) -0.503 (0.866) -5.000 (7.311) 
s&P 500,_1 -0.457"' (0.164) -0.476'" (0.179) 0.167 (0.328) -0.350" (0.169) -0.330 (0.218) 
Bond Spread,_, 0.348"' (0.080) 0.348'" (0.083 ) 0.324'" (0.073) 0.369"' (0.074) 0.364"' (0.075) 
Constant -3.014'" (0.340) -2 .993"' (0.385) -1.967'" (0.415) -2 .890'" (0.391) -2.808" ' (0.483) 
N 804 804 804 804 804 
Note: Dependent variable is daily percentage change in USD/MXN exchange rate. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Two-tailed tests. • p < 0.10, •• p < 0.05, ••• p < 0.01. 
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GOP nominee period. Overall these additional sentiment results indicate that positive and 
negative tweets tend to affect the USD /MXN exchange rate in a similar way, and more positive 
or negative tweets raise volatility further during the GOP nominee period. 
5.3 Disaggregating Tweet Subjects 
In the main paper, we created an aggregate measure of all of Trump's Mexico-related tweets 
based off 17 relevant keywords: peso, Nieto, Pefia, deport, Latino, trade deficit, NAFTA, TPP, 
Mexican, immigrant, Hispanic, trade, Mexico, wall, immigration, illegal, and border. While 
all of these topics could potentially be seen as negative in the eyes of investors-a wall may 
discourage US-Mexico trade-it could be the case that investors are only paying attention to 
trade-related tweets. In order to test this we split up our tweets into two categories: 
• Trade-relevant: all tweets containing at least one mention of the following: peso, trade, 
trade deficit, NAFTA, or TPP 
• Immigration-relevant: all tweets containing at least one mention of the following: de-
port, Latino, Mexican, immigrant, Hispanic, wall, immigration, illegal, border 
Since Nieto, Pefia, and Mexico could be referring either trade or immigration, we excluded these 
terms. 62 days in our sample contained a tweet with relevance to trade, while 194 contained a 
mention of immigration. The results for the trade- and immigration-relevant tweets are shown in 
Table 5. In Model 1, which shows trade-only tweets, there is no evidence that tweets pertaining 
to trade affect either the level or the volatility of the exchange rate across the entire sample 
period, similar to the findings in the main paper. In Model 2, which shows the interactions 
between trade tweets and the political time period dummies, there is evidence of increased 
volatility in the period in which Trump was the GOP nominee. Because there were no tweets 
pertaining to trade when he was president-elect, we omit the Tweett x President-Electt variable. 
The pre-candidate, primary candidate, and president interactions are not statistically significant, 
which is the same as the findings in the main paper. 
For immigration-specific tweets, shown in Models 3 and 4, results are similar to those for 
trade. The non-interactive model (Model 3) shows no evidence that immigration-relevant tweets 
across the entire sample affect either changes in the exchange rate or volatility. In contrast, in 
Model 4 in Table 5 there appears to be evidence that tweets increase volatility in the GOP 
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Table 5: Separating Trade- and Immigration-Specific Tweets 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Trade Only Trade Only Immigration Only Immigration Only 
Mean Equation 
Pct. Peso1_1 0.008 (0.040) 0.011 (0.042) 0.004 (0.040) 0.012 (0.039) 
Tweet1 -0.015 (0.100) -0.066 (0.062) 
S&P 5001-1 0.068 (0.043) 0.064 (0.041) 0.067 (0.043) 0.069 (0.043) 
Bond Spread1_1 0.030 (0.023) 0.039* (0.023) 0.031 (0.023) 0.029 (0.023) 
Ll. ln(Banxico US$ Stock1) 12.266 (16.598) 17.587 (17.111) 13.398 (16.692) 10.314 (16.773) 
Ll. Overnight Rate Difference1 -1.210•• (0.614) -0.884 (0.618) -1.264** (0.611) -1.317** (0.625) 
Banxico US$ Sales1 0.079 (0.065) 0.145** (0.067) 0.088 (0.064) 0.058 (0.066) 
US Presidential Election1 -1.564 (1.053) -1.623** (0. 784) -1.561 (1.060) -1.624 (1.057) 
US Presidential Election1-1 8.402*** (1.160) 8.520••· (0. 751) 8.396*** (1.154) 8.369*** (1.141) 
Trump Primaiy Candidate1 0.057 (0.091) 0.046 (0.089) 0.076 (0.091) 0.014 (0.100) 
Trump GOP Nominee1 0.108 (0.152) 0.079 (0.126) 0.124 (0.150) 0.103 (0.155) 
President-Elect1 0.268 (0.188) 0.160 (0.137) 0.283 (0.189) 0.229 (0.166) 
Trump Presidency1 -0.120 (0.089) -0.063 (0.092) -0.105 (0.090) -0.072 (0.104) 
NAFTA Rounds1 0.198 (0.153) 0.198 (0.171) 0.209 (0.153) 0.224 (0.153) 
Tweet1 xPre-Candidate1 -0.104 (0.211) 0.011 (0.192) 
Tweet1 x Primary Candidate1 0.001 (0.156) 0.050 (0.096) 
Tweet1 xGOP Nominee1 -0.133 (0.494) -0.022 (0.232) 
Tweet1 xPresident-Elect1 0.106 (0.484) 
Tweet1 x Presidency1 -0.030 (0.219) -0.207** (0.094) 
Constant 0.286** (0.146) 0.178 (0.159) 0.283* (0.145) 0.278 (0.181) 
Arch-in-Mean1-1 -0.494** (0.243) -0.360 (0.234) -0.490** (0.232) -0.448* (0.269) 
Variance Equation 
ARCH(l) 0.052** (0.024) 0.085 (0.060) 0.051 ** (0.024) 0.047* (0.027) 
GARCH(l) 0.840*** (0.056) -0.287 (0.193) 0.823••• (0.055) 0.835*** (0.062) 
Tweet1 -0.365 (1.044) -0.391 (0.469) 
Trump Primaiy Candidate1 -0.030 (0.235) 0.060 (0.229) 
Trump GOP Nominee1 0.404 (0.287) 0.419 (0.276) 
President-Elect1 0.071 (0.416) 0.151 (0.376) 
Trump Presidency1 -0.111 (0.226) -0.072 (0.218) 
Tweet1 xPre-Candidate1 -0.115 (0.291) -0.196 (1.127) 
Tweet1 x Primary Candidate1 -0.081 (0.207) -0.645 (0.706) 
Tweet1 x GOP Nominee1 1.042* (0.544) 0.891 * (0.491) 
Tweet1 xPresident-Elect1 1.269* (0.700) 
Tweet1 x Presidency1 0.109 (0.368) -0.854 (0.690) 
S&P 5001-1 -0.337 (0.217) 0.075 (0.062) -0.299 (0.208) -0.395** (0.167) 
Bond Spread1_1 0.350*** (0.094) 0.050 (0.033) 0.322*** (0.086) 0.324*** (0.082) 
Constant -2.897*** (0.432) -0.337 (0.207) -2.704*** (0.403) -2.775*** (0.466) 
N 804 804 804 804 
Note: Dependent variable is daily percentage change in USD/MXN exchange ra te. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Two-tailed tests. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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nominee and president-elect periods. In the mean equation in Model 4, results also suggest 
that tweets when Trump is president result in reduced changes in the USD /MXN exchange 
rate. Taken together, the results in Table 5 are very similar to those found in the main paper; 
tweets-either relevant to trade or immigration-appear to have the same effect on increasing 
volatility in the exchange rate, but only in the GOP nominee and president-elect periods. 
5.4 Robustness of Coding the USD /MXN Exchange Rate 
In this section we explore the robustness of our findings to the use of other measures for the 
percentage change in the USD /MXN nominal exchange rate, the results of which are shown in 
Table 6. In Models 1 and 2, we examine the percentage change in the daily low of the USD /MXN 
exchange rate. In Model 1, there is no evidence that tweets across the entire time period affect 
either changes in this exchange rate or its volatility, similar to previous findings. In Model 2, we 
interact the tweet variable with the political period dummies. While the tweet-political dummy 
interactions are not statistically significant in the mean equation, in the variance equation tweets 
produce a statistically significant increase in volatility in the GOP nominee period. The other 
time periods are in the same direction and of similar magnitude as previous findings as well. 
In Models 3 and 4, we use the percentage daily change in the daily high of the USD /MXN 
exchange rate. Interestingly, both the percentage change in the daily high and daily volatility 
seem to be affected by tweets during the president-elect period. For most of the models in the 
main text and SI, we find that tweets only affect volatility-not value-during this period. We 
thus suspect that tweets may generate more extreme losses ( or highs in this coefficient) in the 
value of the peso relative to the dollar, instead of greater losses in its average daily value. Last, 
in Models 5 and 6 we use an alternative measure of the USD /MXN exchange rate provided by 
the US Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED). The results using this alternative source 
are nearly identical to those in the main paper, since they suggest that tweets do not matter 
across the entire sample and only in the GOP nominee and president-elect periods (and, here, 
in the GOP primary period, although this effect is only weakly statistically significant). 
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Table 6: Alternative Codings of the Peso 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Daily Low Daily Low Daily High Daily High FRED FRED 
Mean Equation 
Pct. Pesor- 1 o.org•• (0.039) 0.081++ (0.039) 0 .040 (0.041) 0.062 (0-040) 0 .023 (0 .039) 0 .023 (0.039) 
Tweet Dummyr -0 .015 (0-047) 0.027 (0.056) 0 .023 (0.060) 
S&P 500,-1 -0. 144 ... (0.032) -0.151••· (0.031) -0.103 ... (0.036) -0.Q9o•• (0.036) -0.002 (0 .042) 0 .007 (0.041) 
Bond Sprew:l.,-1 0.039. (0.021) 0 .03S- (0.021) 0.082+++ (0.021) 0.072••• (0.021) o.o41• (0 .024) 0.044. (0.024) 
!:, ln(Banxico US$ Stock,) 6.203 (13.180) 6.230 (12.795) 8 .945 (16.110) 8.172 (15.009) -2.190 (17.737) -2.152 (17.727) 
.6. Overnight Rate Difference, -1.381••· (0.525) .1.174•• (0.473) 0.578 (0.577) 0.359 (0.631) 0 .167 (0 .631) 0 .370 (0.624) 
Ba.nxico US$ Sa.lesr 0.065 (0.051) 0.075 (0.051) 0.095· (0.058) 0.075 (0.057) 0 .08 1 (0 .067) 0 .089 (0.069) 
US Presidential Electionr -0.840 (0.730) -0.813 (0.806) 0 .295 (1.214) 0.376 (2.169) -0.795 (0 .918) -0 .751 (0.938) 
US P residential Electionr-1 -0.734 (0.620) -0.699 (0.664) 11.793'•• (1.174) 11.613'·· (4.291) 7_093••· (0.954) 7.26 1••· (0.954) 
Trump Primary Ca.ndidater -0.006 (0.065) -0.060 (0.078) 0.203' (0.110) 0.133 (0.093) 0.171 (0.129) 0 .039 (0.123) 
Trump GOP N omineer 0.033 (0.110) 0.012 (0.118) 0 .232 (0.171) 0.069 (0.146) 0 .279 (0.197) 0 .191 (0.199) 
President-Elect, 0.146 (0.143) 0.094 (0.126) 0.365· (0.214) 0.141 (0.145) 0.664 •• (0 .326) 0.473' (0.263) 
Trump Presidencyr -0.116• (0.066) -0.142• (0.078) -0.018 (0.077) 0.014 (0.087) -o.2or (0 .111) -0.289++ (0.126) 
NAFTA fu>unds, O.Q91 (0.135) 0.088 (0.137) 0 .226 (0.141) 0.196 (0.134) 0.289• (0 .153) 0.263' (0.146) 
Tweet, x Pre-Ca.ndida.te, -0.127 (0.118) 0.079 (0.130) -0 .162 (0.159) 
Tweet Dummyrx Prima.ry Candida.ter 0.041 (0.075) 0.047 (0.090) 0.158 (0.105) 
Tweet Dummy, xGOP Nominee, -0.009 (0.229) 0.164 (0.195) 0.178 (0.225) 
Tweet DummyrX President-Elect, -0.184 (0.328) 0.566+ (0.339) 0.465 (0.395) 
Tweet Dummy, x PrESidency, -0.025 (0.074) -0 .003 (0.080) -0 .093 (0.085) 
Constant O.Q99 (0.068) 0.122 (0.075) 0 .154 (0.132) 0.009 (0.095) 0.534♦♦+ (0.173) 0.681+++ (0.176) 
Arch- in-Mea.n,-1 -0.127 (0.089) -0.112 (0.078) -0.587· (0.350) -0 .200 (0.155) . 1,054+++ (0 .326) -1.167+++ (0.286) 
Variance Equation 
ARCH(!) 0 .031 (0.023) 0.032 (0.024) 0.010++ (0.033) 0.106+++ (0.040) 0 .014 (0 .014) 0.008 (0.009) 
GARCH(l) 0_539••· (0.090) 0.576··· (0. 100) 0.429 (0.265) 0.732••· (0.065) o_g49••· (0.061) 0.920••· (0.029) 
Tweet Dummyr 0.084 (0.189) 0 .201 (0.166) 0 .131 (0 .202) 
Trump Primary Ca.ndida.te1 0.152 (0.174) 0.51~•· (0.183) 0 .145 (0 .189) 
Trump GOP N omineer 0.6Tr+•+ (0.225) 0.68.s+++ (0.235) 0.431++ (0 .2 15) 
President-Ele::tr 0.552• (0.298) o.83r•• (0.292) 0 .424 (0 .322) 
Trump Presidency, -0.006 (0.175) 0.114 (0.182) -0.229 (0 .176) 
Tweet DummyrXPre-Ca.ndidater -0.314 (0.488) -3.571 (19.031) 0.572 (0.440) 
Tweet Dummy,xPrimary Ca.ndidater 0.074 (0.279) 0.407 (0.456) 0.41Y- (0.231) 
Tweet Dummy,x GOP Nominee, 1.320··· (0.310) 0.804 (0.728) 1.232•·· (0.314) 
Tweet DummyrX President-Electr 0.098 (0.942) 1.379++ (0.661) 0.900++ (0.456) 
Tweet DummyrxPresidencyr -0.091 (0.289) -0 .574 (0.692) -0 .580 (0.531) 
S&P 500,-1 0.029 (0.108) 0.077 (0.110) 0.229• (0.134) -0.469++ (0.239) -0.266 .. (0 .135) -0.407+++ (0.112) 
Bond Sprea.dr-1 0.523'"++ (0.072) 0_592+++ (0.063) -0.038 (0.079) -0_3,5.3++ (0.154) 0.286+++ (0 .085) 0_39.g+++ (0.061) 
Constant -2.153••· (0.322) -2.173'·· (0.347) -l.860••· (0.558) -2.589 ... (0.252) -2 .776··· (0.481) -3.588··· (0.483) 
N 804 804 804 804 773 773 
Note: Dependent variable is daily percentage change in the daily lows of the USO / MXN exchange rate for Models 
1 and 2, the daily percentage change in the daily high of the USD/MXN exchange rate for Models 3 and 4, and 
the daily percentage change in the average exchange rate for Models 5 and 6 . Standard errors in parentheses. 
Two-tailed tests. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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6 Additional Results 
6.1 Placebo Tweets 
It might be that Thump's Mexico-related tweets coincide with some other factor that is affecting 
the value of the USD /MEX exchange rate. Or that his tweets in general-Mexico-related or 
not-spur movements in either dollar or peso value or volatility or both. To test whether this is 
occurring, we created a set of five "placebo" tweets equal to one if Thump tweeted about Bernie 
Sanders, Hillary Clinton, Ted Cruz, China, or Europe.8 Table 7 shows the number of times a 
subject was mentioned and the total number of days in our sample for which a particular subject 
was mentioned. Mexico and the 14 other related subjects in our analysis were mentioned 676 
times, for a total of 239 days in the analysis. Clinton and Cruz were mentioned an astonishing 
628 and 925 times, respectively; about half of all days in our sample contained at least one tweet 
about Ted Cruz. Tweets about Bernie Sanders, China, and Europe were far less common. 
Table 7: Number of Occurrences Across Subjects 
Subject Raw Number of Occurrences Number of Days 
in Sample in Sample 
Mexico Only 65 48 
Mexico and Related 676 239 
Bernie Sanders 60 37 
Hillary Clinton 628 256 
Ted Cruz 925 454 
China 60 47 
Europe 11 10 
Note: Raw number of occurrences in sample are the total number of times a subject was mentioned. Number of 
days in sample are the number of days in which a subject was mentioned at least once. The subject "Mexico and 
Related" is the one used in the main analysis. Number of observations in sample= 806. 
We next ran our core model specifications on these placebo subjects. We could not include 
Europe in the results since its low number of mentions caused the model to fail to achieve 
convergence. We could not estimate the interactive models for Bernie Sanders or China due to 
similar convergence issues caused by a lack of tweets on these subjects. Still, as is clear from 
Table 8, none of the tweet or lag tweet variables for the four subjects are statistically significant 
for the non-interactive models (Models 1, 2, 4, and 6), in either the mean or variance equation. 
For the interactive models (Models 2 and 5), the only statistically significant interaction is 
8 For China, the search terms were "China" and "Chinese". For Europe, "European", "EU", "Europe" and 
"Euro". 
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Table 8: Placebo Subjects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bernie Sanders Hillary Clinton Hillary Clinton Ted Cruz Ted Cruz China 
Mean Equation 
Pct. Peso1- 1 0.003 (0.040) 0.008 (0.040) -0 004 (0.063) 0.003 (0.040) -0.004 (0.040) 0.005 (0.040) 
Tweet1 0.004 (0.134) -0.014 (0.064) 0.042 (0.055) -0.171 (0.106) 
S&P 500,_1 0.065 (0.044) 0.069 (0.043) 0.069' (0.042) 0.068 (0.043) 0.067 (0.043) 0.068 (0.043) 
Bond Spread,_, 0.03 1 (0.023) 0.030 (0.023) 0.047 .. (0.023) 0.031 (0.023) 0.031 (0.024) 0.029 (0.023) 
/; In (Banxico US$ Stock,) 12.078 (16.673) 12.688 (16.594) 17.052 (17.077) 13.469 (16.592) 13.993 (16.785) 16.144 (17.261) 
6. Overnight Rate Difference, -1.235 .. (0.606) - 1.263++ (0.607) -0.683 (0.629) -1.205' (0.617) -1.151' (0.604) -1.039 (0.686) 
Banx ico US$ Sales: 0.090 (0.065) 0.085 (0.063) 0.146 .. (0.065) 0.082 (0.064) 0.081 (0.065) 0.086 (0.065) 
US Presidential Election, -1.544 {1.045) -1.540 (1.071) -1.595 .. (0.786) -1.581 {1.016) -1.559 (1.016) -1.552 (0.971) 
US Presidential Election1_1 8.408' .. {1.150) 8.428' .. (1.174) 8.434' .. (0.748) 8.352' .. {1.079) 8.370' .. (1.063) 8.318' .. (1.074) 
Trump Primary Candidate1 0.062 (0.093) 0.058 (0.093) 0.055 (0.097) 0.069 (0.092) 0.043 (0.156) 0.103 (0.1 18) 
Trump GOP Nominee1 0.112 (0.151) 0.126 (0.153) 0.074 (0.199) 0.129 (0.149) 0.151 (0.210) 0.203 (0.213) 
President-Elect, 0.280 (0.191) 0.266 (0.186) 0. 163 (0.145) 0.304 (0.191) 0.199 (0.223) 0.446 (0.418) 
Trump Presidency, -0.117 (0.091) -0.123 (0.090) -0 098 (0.095) -0.106 (0.090) -0.127 (0.155) -0 098 (0.099) 
NAFTA Rounds, 0.205 (0.154) 0.203 (0.154) 0.207 (0.161) 0.196 (0.153) 0.217 (0.150) 0.173 (0.162) 
Tweet1 x Pre-Candidate1 -0.090 (0.182) 0.048 (0.155) 
Tweet1 x Primary Candidate1 -0.026 (0.097) 0.062 (0.095) 
Tweet, xG0P Nominee, 0.021 (0.218) -0 024 (0.197) 
Tweet, x President--Elect1 -0.094 (0.267) 0.114 (0.236) 
Tweet1 xPresidency: 0.078 (0.110) 0.022 (0.082) 
Constant 0.289 .. {0.143) 0.298 .. (0.136) 0.079 {0.129) 0.261' {0.141) 0.290 (0.192) 0.391 (0.273) 
Arch-in-Mean1_1 -0.516 .. (0.235) -0.512 .. (0.214) -0.183 (0.170) -0.518 .. (0.214) -0.532 .. (0.210) -0.744 (0.545) 
Variance Equation 
ARCH(! ) 0.053++ (0.025) a.ow++ (0.023) 0.113' (0.059) 0.044' (0.023) 0.045' (0.025) 0.029 (0.033) 
GARCH(l) 0.820' .. (0.061) 0.832+++ (0.050) -0.255 (0.289) 0.836+++ (0.046) 0.83(:i♦ •• (0.054) 0.900+++ (0.095) 
Tweet1 -0.579 {1.105) 0.295 (0.286) -0.360 {0.292) -1.842 (3.769) 
Primary Candidate, 0.056 {0.236) -0.104 (0.243) -0.017 {0.211) 0.032 (0.222) 
GOP Nominee, 0.411 (0.277) 0.230 (0.313) 0.325 (0.275) 0.431 (0.286) 
President-Elect, 0.120 (0.383) 0.100 (0.391) 0.077 (0.370) 0.346 (0.497) 
Presidency; -0.105 (0.216) -0.066 (0.217) -0.135 (0.214) -0.014 (0.226) 
Tweet; x Pre-Candidate; 0.093 (0.236) -0.213 (0.305) 
Tweet; x Primary Candidate; 0.168 {0.148) -0. 344 (0.366) 
Tweet1 xG0P Nominee: 0.508 .. {0.200) 0.305 (0.453) 
Tweet1 x President-Elect1 0.157 (0.381) -1.001 (1.258) 
Tweet1 x Presidency1 -0.450' (0.234) -0.901' (0.507) 
S&P 500,-1 -0.257 (0.241) -0.368' (0.194) 0.097 (0.073) -0.360++ (0.177) -0.294 (0.21 1) -0.412 (0.265) 
Bond Spread,-1 0.333' .. (0.090) 0.352+++ (0.090) 0.061' (0.034) 0.346' .. (0.086) 0,334+++ (0.111) 0.298+++ (0.100) 
O:instant -2.746+++ {0.430) -2.915+++ (0.391) -0.436 {0.288) -2.630+++ {0.380) -2.58t ••• (0.354) _3_373+++ (1.005) 
N 804 804 804 804 804 804 
Note: Dependent variable is daily percentage change in the USD/ MXN exchange rate. Standard errors in paren-
theses. Two-tailed tests. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
16 
that during the GOP nominee period, tweets that included mentions of Hillary Clinton also 
increased variance. Part of this may be because Trump is tweeting about both Clinton and 
Mexico in the same tweet; of the 256 days in our sample that contained a Clinton tweet, 92 
of those days also contained a Mexico-related tweet. No tweets for Ted Cruz were statistically 
significant at conventional levels ( although the tweet-presidency interactions are negative and 
significant at the 10 percent level for both Clinton and Cruz). Moreover, for the interactive 
models, none of the interactions are statistically significant in the mean equation in Table 8. 
Taken together, these placebo results provide further evidence that Trump's Mexico-related 
tweets are what affect the peso, rather than his general tweets or some other tweet subject. 
6.2 Trump's Mexico-Related Tweets and the Mexican Stock Market 
In this section, we examine whether Trump's Mexico-related tweets affect the MSCI Mexican 
Stock market index. Table 9 shows how tweets ( Tweet Dummy) affect the percentage change 
in the MSCI Mexican stock market index. As shown in Models 1 and 2, tweets do not affect 
changes in the stock market index. To see if Trump's Mexico-related tweets affect Mexican 
stock market volatility, in Models 3 and 4 we add Tweet Dummy to the variance equation. 
While there appears to be evidence of volatility in Model 3, as suggested by the statistically 
significant ARCH and GARCH effects, Tweet Dummy is not statistically significant. 
Last, in Model 4 we show interaction between tweets and the political period dummies. In 
the mean equation, tweets appear to lead to positive and then negative changes in the Mexican 
stock market index in the pre-candidate and primary candidate periods, respectively, although 
these effects are only weakly statistically significant. Turning to volatility, the Trump presidency 
in Model 4 is statistically significant at the 0.10 level and negative, which indicates that volatility 
decreases in response to a tweet during this period (relative to the other periods). No other 
periods are statistically significant; again indicating that tweets do not affect the Mexican stock 
market. Thus, the results here show only weak evidence that Mexico-related tweets are having 
any effect on either the value or volatility of the Mexican stock market. 
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Table 9: Mexican Stock Market Index 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mean Equation 
MSCI Mexico,_1 -0.115*' (0.047) -0.143'*' (0.046) -0.126'" (0.047) -0.071 (0.046) 
Pct. Peso,-1 -0.622*** (0.069) -0.551' *' (0.063) -0.531*** (0.064) -0.535*** (0.067) 
Tweet Dummy, -0.038 (0.096) 0.008 (0.085) 0.018 (0.085) 
S&P 500,_ 1 0.053 (0.066) 0.079 (0.067) 0.063 (0.071) 0.020 (0.072) 
Bond Spread,-1 -0.013 (0.036) -0.039 (0.035) -0.019 (0.037) 0.012 (0.038) 
fl ln(Banxico US$ Stock,) 12.130 (27.518) 13.610 (27.625) 8.610 (28.213) 10.005 (27.646) 
fl Overnight Rate Difference, 0.610 (0.893) -0.034 (0.907) -0.141 (0.892) -0.119 (0.905) 
Banxico US$ Sales, -0.202* (0.106) -0.035 (0.102) -0.032 (0.101) -0.086 (0.107) 
US Presidential Election, 0.248 (1.234) 0.392 (1.660) 0.352 (1.630) 0.052 (1.376) 
US Presidential Election,-1 -9.884*** (1.228) -10.083*** (1.784) -10.151*** (1.691) -9.965*** (1.355) 
Trump Primary Candidate, -0.051 (0.135) -0.043 (0.128) -0.191 (0.161) 0.032 (0.191) 
Trump GOP Nominee, -0.108 (0.187) 0.031 (0.194) -0.180 (0.232) 0.052 (0.257) 
President-Elect, -0.158 (0.212) -0.153 (0.216) -0.194 (0.265) -0.015 (0.265) 
Trump Presidency, -0.019 (0.142) 0.159 (0.146) 0.259 (0.189) 0.370* (0.205) 
NAFTA Rounds, -0.363 (0.290) -0.303* (0.176) -0.329* (0.190) -0.384 (0.234) 
Tweet Dummy,xPre-Candidate, 0.427* (0.245) 
Tweet Dummy,xPrimary Candidate, -0.269* (0.161) 
Tweet Dummy,xGOP Nominee, -0.179 (0.314) 
Tweet Dummy1xPresident-Elect1 -0.280 (0.481) 
Tweet Dummy,xPresidency, 0.175 (0.133) 
Constant 0.160 (0.128) -0.271 (0.207) -0.475 (0.309) -0.952*** (0.314) 
Arch-in-Mean,-1 0.213** (0.102) 0.378** (0.189) 0.631**' (0.190) 
Variance Equation 
ARCH(l) 0.062*** (0.018) 0.030 (0.020) 0.011 (0.017) 
GARCH(l) 0.926*** (0.022) 0.901*** (0.036) 0.826*** (0.037) 
Tweet Dummy, -0.328 (0.372) 
Trump Primary Candidate, 0.350 (0.290) 
Trump GOP Nominee, 0.644* (0.375) 
President-Elect, -0.020 (0.433) 
Trump Presidency, -0.283 (0.268) 
Tweet Dummy1xPre-Candidate1 -0.091 (0.504) 
Tweet Dummy,xPrimary Candidate, 0.187 (0.204) 
Tweet Dummy,xGOP Nominee, 0.514 (0.356) 
Tweet Dummy1xPresident-Elect, -0.087 (0.894) 
Tweet Dummy1xPresidency1 -0. 743* (0.387) 
S&P 500,-1 -0.439*** (0.152) -0.450*** (0.088) 
Bond Spread,- 1 0.337*** (0.112) 0.304*** (0.058) 
Constant 0.020 (0.013) -2.628**' (0.633) -1.666*** (0.257) 
N 804 804 804 804 
Note: Dependent variable is daily percentage change in MSCI Mexico Stock Market Index. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Two-tailed tests. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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6.3 Trump's Mexico-Related Tweets and the Mexican Bond Market 
Table 10 examines the impact of Trump's Mexico-related tweets on the percentage change in the 
interest rate spread between 10-year Mexican and US government bonds. Similar to the results 
for the Mexican stock market, there is no evidence that tweets across the entire sample affect 
the bond spread in the mean equation, as shown in Models 1, 2, and 3. There appears to be 
some evidence that tweets have a positive and statistically significant effect on the percentage 
change in bond spreads in the president-elect period, and a negative effect in the GOP nominee 
period, although this is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
Table 10: Bond Spreads 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mean Equation 
Bond Spread,-1 -0.032 (0.038) -0.029 (0.039) -0.034 (0.040) -0.027 (0.040) 
Pct. Peso,-1 0 .463*** (0.064) 0.397*** (0.067) 0.352*** (0.063) 0.378*** (0.064) 
Tweet Dummy, 0.134 (0.103) 0.076 (0.094) 0.091 (0.096) 
S&P 500,-1 0.208*** (0.067) 0.168** (0.065) 0.156** (0.068) 0.172** (0.070) 
A In(Banxico US$ Stock,) 83.021*** (29.501) 75.295*** (28.758) 72.560** (30.057) 67.323** (28.842) 
t:. Overnight Rate Difference, -1.165 (0.958) -1.032 (1.052) -0. 724 (0.945) -0.976 (0.965) 
Banxico US$ Sales, 0.095 (0.114) -0.028 (0.114) -0.021 (0.110) -0.051 (0.108) 
US Presidential Election, -1.742 (1.318) -1.724 (3.596) -1.913' (1.082) -1.959 (1.244) 
US Presidential Election,-1 5.778*** (1.319) 3.580* (2.037) 4.182*** (1.427) 5.527*** (1.213) 
Thump Primary Candidate, 0.042 (0.145) 0.015 (0.154) -0.388 (0.311) -0.045 (0.195) 
Thump GOP Nominee, 0.055 (0.200) -0.073 (0.211) -0.585 (0.374) 0.034 (0.251) 
President-Elect, 0.172 (0.227) 0.264 (0.258) 0.841 (0.609) 0.089 (0.283) 
Thump Presidency, -0.004 (0.152) -0.124 (0.173) -0.878** (0.374) -0.242 (0.212) 
NAFTA Rounds, 0.220 (0.311) 0.125 (0.252) 0.150 (0.251) 0.156 (0.249) 
Tweet Dummy,xPre-Candidate1 0.304 (0.308) 
Tweet Dummy1xPrimary Candidate, 0.230 (0.159) 
Tweet Dummy,xGOP Nominee, -0.527* (0.291) 
Tweet Dummy,x President-Elect, 1.346** (0.661) 
Tweet Dummy1x Presidency1 -0.037 (0.140) 
Constant -0.076 (0.137) 0.467 (0.309) 1.666*** (0.606) 0.666** (0.300) 
Arch-in-Mean,_1 -0.273** (0.139) -0.756*** (0.269) -0.349*** (0.128) 
Variance Equation 
ARCH(l) 0.074*** (0.028) 0.043* (0.022) 0.027 (0.022) 
GARCH(l) 0.859*** (0.062) 0.600*** (0.106) 0.749'** (0.075) 
Tweet Dummy, -0.048 (0.126) 
Thump Primary Candidate, -0.328' (0.169) 
Thump GOP Nominee, -0.434** (0.220) 
President-Elect, 0.244 (0.253) 
Thump Presidency, -0.701*** (0.173) 
S&P 500,-1 -0.081 (0.102) -0.273** (0.136) 
Bond Spread,-1 0.165*** (0.058) 0.361*** (0.062) 
Tweet Dummy1x Pre-Candidate1 0.540 (0.361) 
Tweet Dummy,xPrimary Candidate, -0.076 (0.250) 
Tweet Dummy,xGOP Nominee, -0.129 (0.536) 
Tweet Dummy1x President-Elect1 0.787* (0.467) 
Tweet Dummy,xPresidency, -1.028** (0.487) 
Constant 0.110 (0.068) -0.238 (0.333) -1.176*** (0.380) 
N 804 804 804 804 
Note: Dependent variable is daily percentage percentage change in the interest rate spread between 10-year 
Mexican and US government bonds. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01. 
Tweets also do not appear to affect volatility in bond spreads across the full sample, as 
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shown by the lack of statistical significance on the Tweet coefficient in the variance equation in 
Model 3. Model 4 shows that tweets are not statistically significantly different from zero during 
much of the election process, with the exception that they appear to increase volatility in the 
president-elect period (though this effect is only weakly statistically significant), while reducing 
volatility during the Trump presidency. 
7 Asymmetric Shocks to the Peso 
In all models with conditional heteroskedasticity, we saw that covariates affect not only changes 
in the USD /MXN exchange rate (the "mean equation") but also the conditional variance. We 
also found evidence that unexpected shocks affect volatility (the "ARCH" term) as well as the 
lagged value of volatility itself (the "GARCH" term). All of our models assumed that any shocks 
not modeled in the conditional variance had a uniform effect, no matter their sign. In other 
words, if the error term in one period was positive, and of the same magnitude as a negative 
error in another period, our models assumed that these shocks had equivalent effects on the 
conditional variance.9 
However, a large literature exists on how unexpected news tends to have asymmetric ef-
fects on markets. "Bad" unexpected economic news (unexpected innovations that depreciate 
the peso relative to the dollar) may have a different effect than "good" unexpected news (un-
expected innovations that appreciate the peso relative to the dollar). A series of asymmetric 
ARCH/GARCH models have thus been developed to model and test for this phenomenon. In 
this section we estimate three types of GARCH models that allow for asymmetries in the error. 
Because these models are more difficult to estimate than the GARCH models above and in the 
main paper, we could not include covariates in the conditional variance equation, since these 
models could not achieve convergence. Still, the results in Table 11 show some interesting things. 
In Model 1, we specify a simple asymmetric-or SAARCH-model (Engle 1990), which 
appears as follows: 
(2) 
9This occurs in standard ARCH models due to the fact that the lagged error-i.e., the ARCH term-is squared: 
e;_1 • 
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In other words, we add C02Et-l to the model, which allows the conditional variance to be affected 
differently if Ei-1 is positive or negative, as opposed to the standard ARCH(l) term, ro1£;_1. As 
shown in Model 1 in Table 11, the ARCH term is positive and statistically significant as is the 
GARCH term, similar to the findings above and in the main paper. The SAARCH term is also 
positive and statistically significant, which suggests that more positive errors tend to increase 
the error variance. There thus appears to be some amount of asymmetry taking place based on 
whether the error is positive or negative. 
Table 11: Asymmetric ARCH/GARCH Models 
(1) (2) (3) 
SAARCH EGARCH APARCH 
Mean Equation 
Pct. Pesoi-1 0.013 (0.042) 0.023 (0.040) 0.015 (0.042) 
Tweet1 0.012 (0.058) 0.022 (0.058) 0.014 (0.058) 
Bond Spread1_1 0.030 (0.023) 0.031 (0.023) 0.031 (0.023) 
S&P 5001-l 0.054 (0.041) 0.061 (0.041) 0.058 (0.042) 
~ln Banxico US$ Stock1 10.163 (15.939) 10.057 (16.446) 9.633 (15.932) 
~ Overnight Rate Difference 1 -1.191 ** (0.600) -1.158* (0.620) -1.133* (0.594) 
Banxico US$ Sales1 0.142** (0.066) 0.139** (0.066) 0.139** (0.067) 
US Presidential Election1 -2.090 (1.347) -2.405*** (0.895) -2.294* (1.172) 
US Presidential Election1_1 7.448*** (1.279) 8.836*** (1.010) 7 .260*** (1.053) 
Trump Primary Candidate1 0.038 (0.078) 0.028 (0.080) 0.032 (0.079) 
Trump GOP Nominee1 -0.012 (0.117) -0.004 (0.112) -0.016 (0.116) 
Trump President-Elect1 0.186 (0.129) 0.208 (0.127) 0.191 (0.130) 
Trump Presidency1 -0.047 (0.083) -0.061 (0.084) -0.056 (0.084) 
NAFTA Rounds1 0.205 (0.160) 0.193 (0.170) 0.198 (0.162) 
Constant -0.022 (0.075) -0.015 (0.075) -0.017 (0.075) 
Variance Equation 
ARCH(l) 0.078** (0.034) 
SAARCH(l) 0.055** (0.027) 
GARCH(l) 0.851 *** (0.075) 
EARCH(l) 0.055 (0.035) 
Asy. EARCH(l) 0.163*** (0.062) 
EGARCH(l) 0.921*** (0.050) 
PARCH(l) 0.082** (0.038) 
Asy. PARCH(l) 0.318 (0.257) 
PGARCH(l) 0.844 *** (0.076) 
Power 1.599** (0.637) 
Constant 0.046 (0.029) -0.039 (0.027) 0.055 (0.035) 
N 804 804 804 
Note: Regression with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is daily percent change in the 
USD/MXN exchange rate. Two-tailed tests. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 




As the results indicate, the EARCH(l) term (ro1 .;,-::_~ ) is positive but not statistically significant, 
while both the asymmetric EARCH(l) (ro2 (Id,~~ 1-'1£)) and EGARCH(l (ro3ln(cr;_1)) terms 
are. 
Last, in Model 3 we show an asymmetric power ARCH, or APARCH model (Ding, Granger 
and Engle 1993): 
(4) 
The results are difficult to interpret, but the power term, s, is about 1.6 and statistically sig-
nificant. While the PARCH(l) term is positive and statistically significant, its asymmetric 
counterpart is not. Last, the power GARCH term is positive and statistically significant. 
To better show how asymmetry is taking place, it is common to show a "news response 
function" of the expected conditional error variance given a positive or negative shock. Each 
of the three models from Table 11 is shown in Figure 5.10 As is clear from the figure, negative 
shocks appear to raise expected conditional variance to a lesser extent than positive shocks. 
Since a positive shock signifies the peso experienced a percent increase towards depreciation 
relative to the dollar, this aligns with expectations about how unexpected bad news contributes 
to greater volatility than unexpected good news. This effect holds across all three asymmetric 
models from Table 11. Unfortunately, since we could not add predictors to the heteroskedastic 
variance in these models, these shocks could be due to any form of unexpected news~including 
tweets~that affect the USD /MXN exchange rate. Still, these results show that "bad" news 
(unexpected innovations that depreciate the peso relative to the dollar) affect volatility more 
than appreciations ("good" news), which is in line with our findings in the main text. 
10For these predictions, we have to assume a expected variance when the error is zero; we assume 0.5, which is 
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8 VECM Analysis of the Mexican and US Stock Markets 
In the main paper we chose to use the US S&P 500 stock market indicator rather than the MSCI 
Mexican stock market indicator. This was done for several reasons. First, since the peso is such 
a commonly traded currency, a lot of its movement depends on not just the Mexican economy 
but also the health of the US and global economy more broadly. Second, the two indicators (the 
percentage change in each respective stock market index) are correlated at 0.51. Third, while 
we do not find any evidence that the stationary, percentage change in the two series have any 
causal relationship between one another, we do find evidence that in the raw series, movements 
in the S&P 500 are driving changes in the Mexican Index.11 
As evidence of this, we present a vector error correction model (VECM) in Table 12. We 
included three lags for each model, as well as a deterministic linear trend. Tests indicate that 
there is a cointegrating relationship between the two series. Moreover, as Table 13 shows, 
Granger causality block exogeneity tests on the lagged first-differences indicate that, at least 
in the short-run, movements in the S&P 500 drive changes in the Mexican stock market, not 
the other way around. Last, in Figure 6 we show orthogonalized impulse response functions, 
which depict (moving clockwise from top left) a shock in the Mexican stock market index on 
itself, Mexican stock market on the S&P 500, the S&P 500 on itself, and the S&P 500 on the 
nwe used a vector autoregressive model (VAR) for the percentage change series (not reported here) and, using 
Granger-causality tests, find no evidence that the previous value of one series appears to be driving the other. 
23 
Mexican stock market. As is clear from Figure 6, shocks to the S&P 500 cause movements in the 
Mexican stock market, not the reverse. Thus, we are fairly confident that the most important 
stock market index to include is the S&P 500. 
Table 12: VECM Results Show the S&P 500 Drives the Mexican Stock Market 
S&P 500 Index Mexican Index 
Cointegrating Equation 0.001 (0.005) 0.050** 
~S&P 500t-1 -0.021 (0.042) 0.339* 
~S&P 500t-2 -0.093** (0.042) -0.351 * 
~S&P 500t-3 -0.014 (0.042) 0.172 
~Mexican Indexi-1 0.004 (0.009) 0.121 *** 
~Mexican Indext-2 0.009 (0.009) -0.013 
~Mexican IndeXt-3 -0.002 (0.009) -0.101 ** 
Trend 0.004 (0.002) -0.000 
Constant -0.369 (1.155) -0.042 
N 801 
VECM with standard errors in parentheses. Two-tail tests. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 13: Granger Causality Tests 
Test: x2 
S&P 500 Index -+ Mexican Index 8.30** 










Note: Block exogeneity tests using contemporaneous coefficients of VECM. Ho: Granger non-causality. t=0.10, 
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Figure 6: Orthogonalized Impulse Response Function 
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